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ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL AND FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
Zeynep Sefika Kabukcuoglu, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2015
This dissertation is a collection of three essays in international and financial economics. In
these essays, I focus on government debt and firm financing decisions over the business cycle.
In the first essay, I study the role of income inequality in government’s borrowing and default
decisions. To explore the relationship between default risk and income inequality, I extend
the standard endogenous default model to allow for heterogeneous agents. The main finding
of this paper is that inequality shocks can increase the default risk significantly. The model
can also generate high consumption volatility of poor households relative to rich households,
consistent with the data. I extend the model by introducing progressive income taxes and
show that as the progressivity of the tax increases, the probability of default decreases.
In the second essay, I address how the financing of working capital plays a role in the
default risk and the business cycle characteristics observed in emerging market economies.
I propose a general equilibrium model with endogenous sovereign default risk and working
capital conditions and study the role of labor markets in generating the drops in output
observed in defaults. I find that the working capital condition increases the default risk
through a feedback loop. I show that this model is able to match the countercyclical interest
rates, high volatility of consumption relative to output and countercyclical trade balance
observed in Argentina.
The third essay analyzes the role of binding financing constraints on manufacturing firms’
investment decisions in the U.S., using the Great Recession period as a natural case study.
The main finding of this paper is that firms that do not borrow from public bond markets
experienced binding liquidity constraints on their R&D investments during the recession.
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The paper also compares the evidence on financial constraints in R&D investments to the
evidence about capital and inventory investments. Firms without bond ratings show the
highest liquidity sensitivity for inventory investments, and investment-liquidity sensitivity is
greater for capital than it is for R&D investments.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is a collection of three essays in international and financial economics.
The essays focus on government debt and firm financing decisions over the business cycle.
Sovereign defaults are rare events, but they are very destructive because they are usually
linked with banking or financial crises that have long-run e↵ects on the economy. So far, the
literature has considered mainly the role of fluctuations in output in sovereign risk over the
business cycle. In the first and second essays, I focus on two channels that have not been
studied in the literature. The first essay explores the role of income inequality in generating
sovereign risk. The second essay studies how private credit and firms’ labor demand decision
are connected with sovereign risk. The third essay investigates the e↵ects of financial crises
on firm investment. In particular, I study firms investment behavior and financial constraints
during the Great Recession and identify financially-constrained firms using the last recession
period as a natural case-study.
The first essay, titled “Income Inequality and Sovereign Default,” is presented in Chapter
2. In this paper, I study the role of income inequality in government’s borrowing and
default decisions. I address the question of whether higher income inequality increases the
probability of default. First, I present some empirical evidence for the e↵ect of inequality on
the creditworthiness of sovereign bonds. I show that an increase in a country’s Gini index in a
given year is associated with a decrease in the creditworthiness of sovereign bonds in the next
year. To explore the relationship between endogenous default risk and income inequality,
I consider a stochastic general equilibrium model following an approach similar to that of
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). I model a small open economy with two types of households. In
addition to output shocks that a↵ect the average level of endowment, I introduce shocks that
a↵ect its distribution, which I call inequality shocks. The economy is subject to aggregate
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uncertainty about future endowments, and households cannot completely insure against the
shocks. There is also a utilitarian government that can issue non-state contingent, one-period
bond contracts to borrow from risk-neutral foreign lenders, retaining the option to default at
any time. The government internalizes how its borrowing decisions a↵ect both the default
risk and the price of bonds, which determines the interest rates.
The main finding of this paper is that inequality shocks can increase the default risk signif-
icantly. The key intuition for this result is that when the economy is subject to both adverse
inequality and output shocks, the marginal utility of consumption of the poor increases sig-
nificantly relative to that of the rich. This generates a large tax burden, particularly on poor
households, and the government chooses to default more often to wipe out the debt burden.
Therefore, the government uses default as a redistribution mechanism between households.
I calibrate the model to match the business cycle statistics of Argentina and Mexico and
find that the model explains the business cycle statistics observed in both countries well. In
addition, it can also generate high consumption volatility of poor households relative to rich
households. Incomplete asset markets, together with output and inequality shocks, are key
for this result. This is an important contribution of the paper that the prior literature has
not addressed. As a policy exercise, I extend the model by introducing progressive income
taxes and analyze the e↵ect of these taxes on debt levels and default probability. I show that
as the progressivity of the tax increases, the probability of default decreases. The tax system
helps eliminate the e↵ect of inequality shocks in the model and reduces the dispersion in the
marginal utilities of consumption between households. Therefore, I obtain larger debt in the
simulated economies.
In Chapter 3, titled “Sovereign Risk and Private Credit in Labor Markets,” I propose a
theory that can explain three observations pertaining to emerging market economies. First,
as Neumeyer and Perri (2005) show, emerging markets are characterized by countercyclical
interest rates. Second, during default episodes, there are large drops in labor and output.
Third, Arteta and Hale (2008) show that during sovereign debt crises, there is a significant
decline in foreign credit to private firms. Firms can use private credit to finance their working
capital, and there can be a feedback loop between sovereign risk and the cost of private credit.
In this paper, I investigate the nexus among firms’ labor demand decision, private credit and
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government’s borrowing decisions, focusing on the role of labor markets. Particularly, I am
interested in how private credit and government’s default risk are related to the drops in
output observed after sovereign defaults.
I find that the working capital condition serves as a channel that increases the default
risk. When the economy receives a low TFP shock, firms demand less labor and cut down
production. This increases the governments incentives to borrow more. Because shocks
are persistent, foreign lenders ask for a higher premium when they lend to the government.
Higher interest rates on the government bonds increase the default risk, and the finance of
working capital becomes more costly for firms. This generates further reductions in output
and higher spreads on the government bond, which is the feedback loop in the model. I show
that this model is able to match the business cycle statistics observed in Argentina, as well
as the large drops in output and labor during default episodes.
Chapter 4 presents the third essay, titled “R&D Investment and Financial Constraints
During the Great Recession.” It analyzes the role of binding financing constraints on firms’
investment decisions, using the Great Recession period as a natural case study. The recession
started with the emergence of the subprime loan crisis, which created turmoil in the housing
market and had subsequent real e↵ects on the economy. This aspect of the recession makes it
a good setting in which to analyze firms’ investment behavior after being hit by an exogenous
shock. Since R&D projects involve high uncertainty, it is expensive for firms to find external
sources of finance–and it becomes even more expensive during financial crises. This implies
that R&D is sensitive to internal resources during recessions. This sensitivity is even greater
for financially-constrained firms, such as firms without access to bond markets. In order
to test for the existence of financial constraints, I estimate the e↵ect of liquidity at the
beginning of the recession on the growth rate of R&D stocks over the recession, controlling
for firm profitability, size and age, as well as for industry characteristics.
The main finding of this paper is that firms that do not borrow from public bond mar-
kets experienced binding liquidity constraints on their R&D investments during the recession.
The evidence for liquidity constraints is also documented for various subsamples that are
likely to face financial constraints, such as small firms, young firms and firms that do not
pay dividends. Sensitivity of R&D investment to liquidity is, again, strongest for those firms
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without bond ratings in these subsamples. I also compare the evidence for financial con-
straints in R&D investments to the evidence about capital and inventory investments. I find
that firms without bond ratings show the highest liquidity sensitivity for inventory invest-
ments, and investment-liquidity sensitivity is greater for capital than for R&D investments.
The results confirm the business cycle properties of these series–i.e., inventory investment is
the most volatile and R&D investment the least volatile type of investment.
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2.0 INCOME INEQUALITY AND SOVEREIGN DEFAULT1
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Emerging markets are characterized by countercyclical spreads, countercyclical trade balance
and high volatility of consumption relative to output over the business cycle. Sovereign debt
and default risk have significant e↵ects on business cycle characteristics and the financial
sector in emerging markets. Therefore, it is very important to understand the channels that
play a role in generating sovereign risk. The endogenous sovereign default literature has
focused mainly on the e↵ects of output shocks on default risk. In this paper, we investigate
another channel, which is the role of income inequality in government’s borrowing and default
decisions. This paper addresses the following two questions: Does higher income inequality
increase the probability of default? Furthermore, how do changes in income inequality
compare to changes in output in explaining the variation in default risk?
In order to explore the relationship between endogenous default risk and income inequal-
ity, we consider a stochastic general equilibrium model following an approach similar to that
of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). We model a small open economy with two types of house-
holds. In addition to output shocks that a↵ect the average level of endowment, we introduce
shocks that a↵ect its distribution, which we call inequality shocks.2 The economy is sub-
ject to aggregate uncertainty about future endowments, and households cannot completely
insure against the shocks. The output and inequality shocks have di↵erent e↵ects on the
endowments; an adverse output shock lowers the endowments of both types, but an adverse
1This research is a joint work with Kiyoung Jeon.
2Even though our model treats the changes in income inequality as exogenous, these shocks can be
motivated by the fact that idiosyncratic labor earnings risk exhibits countercyclical volatility, as shown by
Storesletten et al. (2004).
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inequality shock raises the endowment of the rich households and reduces the endowment
of the poor households, increasing the dispersion between the endowments. There is also
a benevolent government that represents the preferences of the households and can issue
non-state contingent, one-period bond contracts to borrow from risk-neutral foreign lenders,
retaining the option to default at any time. We assume that default entails exogenous drops
in output and that the economy goes into autarky temporarily. The government internal-
izes how its borrowing decisions a↵ect the default risk, as well as the price of bonds, which
determines the interest rates.
In our model, the government would like to borrow on behalf of households for two rea-
sons. First, the government uses bond contracts and rebates the proceeds of debt operations
equally across households to help them smooth consumption. Second, the equilibrium inter-
est rate is lower than the discount rate of the government, so the government would like to
shift future consumption to today by borrowing. The level of existing debt and the size of the
shocks are crucial for government’s borrowing decision. As the debt accumulates, it becomes
harder to roll over because the benefits of borrowing diminish. Defaults are particularly more
attractive in recessions, in high inequality states and when there is high debt accumulation
because foreign lenders o↵er bond contracts that have higher interest rates in those states,
which creates a borrowing constraint for the government. The government’s goal is to maxi-
mize household’s expected lifetime utilities, so it achieves this goal by trying to equalize the
marginal utilities of consumption between households and across time. Default can reduce
the gap in the marginal utilities of consumption between the two types of households because
the burden of debt payment can be eliminated. Consequently, in our model, default can serve
as a redistribution mechanism that improves households’ welfare. The main finding of this
paper is that inequality shocks can increase the default risk significantly. The key intuition
for this result is that when the economy is subject to both adverse inequality and output
shocks, the marginal utility of consumption of the poor increases significantly relative to the
marginal utility of consumption of the rich. This generates a large tax burden, particularly
on poor households, and the government chooses to default more often to wipe out the debt
burden.
When we consider the role of each shock, we find that default risk is slightly higher
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when there are output shocks than inequality shocks. This is because the implied default
penalties are di↵erent in the two models. In the case of output shocks, the default penalty
is higher in good states of the world and smaller otherwise. So with smaller penalty and
tighter borrowing constraints in bad states, we observe a larger default rate. On the other
hand, in case of inequality shocks the default penalty is constant across all states because
aggregate output is constant. This generates a lower probability of default in this model
because the cost of default is higher. However, each shock alone can generate only about one
sixth of the probability of default observed when there are both shocks in the model. Thus,
we show that the joint e↵ect of these shocks helps the model generate a default probability
consistent with the data. The reason behind this result is the VAR(1) process estimated from
the Argentine data. Based on the estimates of the structural parameters, we find that high
inequality at time t 1 leads to lower output at time t. Also, the estimates of the covariances
of the shocks are negative, which implies that there is more likely to be an adverse output
shock together with an adverse inequality shock. These characteristics play an important
role in lenders’ and the government’s expectations about the future state of the economy.
An adverse inequality shock not only amplifies the e↵ect of a low output shock today, but
also creates a deep-seated pessimism that the recession will be more severe in the future.
As a result, foreign lenders ask for a higher premium even for smaller levels of debt. This
increases the borrowing constraints for the government, and default becomes the optimal
decision.
The model is calibrated using Argentine data between 1990-2002, and we simulate the
model to generate the business cycle statistics. Our model’s results regarding the default
probabilities can be compared to the results in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006).3 Similar to
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), the default probability when the economy is hit by an output
shock is quite low, only 0.52 percent. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) also use shocks to the
trend of output and generate a default probability of around two percent. On the other hand,
the inequality shocks generate a default probability of 0.32 percent. Using shocks to both
output and inequality, our model can match countercyclical interest rates, high volatility of
3Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) assume a representative agent model; yet their default penalty structure
and calibration strategy are similar to ours.
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consumption and output, and countercyclical trade balance. In addition to that, inequality
is countercyclical with output and positively correlated with interest rate spreads.
We also calibrate the model to match the business cycle statistics of Mexico. We find
that the model can explain the business cycle statistics observed in Mexico well. In addition,
it can also generate high consumption volatility of the poor households relative to the rich
households. We find that the ratio of the volatilities is close to its data counterpart. Incom-
plete asset markets together with output and inequality shocks are key for this result. In
the model, income inequality shocks amplify the e↵ect of output shocks particularly on the
poor households’ endowment. Since there are no other assets that the households can use to
insure against these shocks, poor households have higher volatility of consumption than the
rich households. This is an important contribution of the paper that has not been shown by
the existing papers in the literature before.
As a policy implication, we extend the model by introducing progressive income taxes
and analyze the e↵ect of these taxes on the debt levels and the default probability. When it
is costly to borrow for the government, i.e. the proceeds of the debt operations are negative,
the government finances the existing debt by issuing progressive income taxes. We adopt the
progressive tax regime that Heathcote et al. (2014) present. However, when it is cheap to
borrow, the government does not tax households, it simply distributes the transfers across
households. We show that as the progressivity of the tax increases, the probability of default
decreases. The tax system helps eliminate the e↵ect of inequality shocks in the model
and reduces the dispersion in the marginal utilities of consumption between households.
Therefore, we obtain larger debt in the simulated economies.
This paper relates to the recent quantitative models that explore emerging markets’
business cycles and sovereign debt. We contribute to the sovereign default literature by
incorporating the role of income inequality as an additional source of default risk. The en-
dogenous sovereign default literature starts with the seminal paper of Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) and continues with Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008), Martin and Ven-
tura (2010), Yue (2010), Pitchford and Wright (2011), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012a),
Amador and Aguiar (2014) and Gennaioli et al. (2014), some of which were mentioned
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above.4 Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), and Chat-
terjee and Eyigungor (2012b) consider long maturity bonds in a representative agent frame-
work. Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) and Hatchondo et al. (2009) study the role of political
uncertainties in sovereign default risk. Martin and Ventura (2010) and Broner et al. (2008)
show that well-functioning secondary markets can eliminate the default risk. All these pa-
pers use representative agent models and focus on the role of output shocks. Our paper is
also closely related to D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2012) and D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2013),
the main focus of which is the relationship between wealth inequality and default using a
heterogeneous agent framework. D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2012) have endogenous wealth
heterogeneity that comes from idiosyncratic income shocks; however, the amount of bonds
is determined by a fiscal reaction function and does not come from the maximization of
household utility. As mentioned above, in our model, the government optimally chooses the
level of next-period bonds taking into account the welfare of the households. Furthermore,
we show that income inequality shocks tend to have a systematic relationship with output
shocks, so we incorporate this dimension into our model to generate inequality. D’Erasmo
and Mendoza (2013) study the distributional e↵ects of sovereign debt default in a two-period,
closed economy model, assuming an exogenous initial wealth distribution. In their closed
economy setup, they study optimal debt and default decisions on domestic debt. However, in
our model, we focus on borrowing and default on external debt in a small open economy. In
this sense, our paper is complementary to these two papers. Cuadra et al. (2010) study fiscal
policy and default risk using a representative agent model, in which tax on consumption is
endogenously determined and the revenues are used to finance public goods. In our paper,
we assume progressive taxes on income.
Our paper is also related to the immense empirical literature that studies the determi-
nants of sovereign default. Cantor and Packer (1996) show that income, external debt and
economic development are significant determinants of credit risk. Reinhart et al. (2003)
show that a country’s past behavior about meeting its debt obligations can be a good pre-
dictor of its ability to pay future debt, pointing out the importance of financial institutions.
4Also see Panizza et al. (2009), Wright (2011) and Aguiar and Amador (2013) for good reviews of this
literature.
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Hatchondo et al. (2007) argue that countries are more likely to default during periods with
low resources, high borrowing costs and changes in political circumstances, and Gonza´lez-
Rozada and Yeyati (2008) examine the role of global factors, such as liquidity, risk appetite
and contagion, in explaining the emerging market spreads.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We provide a more formal analysis of
the empirical results, showing the relationship between income inequality and credit scores
in Section 2.2. We then present the model and define the recursive equilibrium in Section
2.3. We discuss the calibration, the quantitative analysis of the model and the simulation
results with counterfactual experiments in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the business
cycle statistics obtained for Mexico and discusses the di↵erences in consumption volatilities
between rich and poor households. Section 2.6 shows the e↵ects of income taxes. Section
2.7 concludes.
2.2 EMPIRICAL MOTIVATION
In this section, we provide empirical results that support the relationship between income
inequality and default risk. We use credit ratings dataset as a measure of default risk.
Reinhart (2002) shows that credit ratings can predict defaults well.5 First, we show that
income inequality is positively correlated with the creditworthiness of sovereign bonds. Next,
we provide evidence on the fact that income inequality is countercyclical over the business
cycle.
2.2.1 Income Inequality and Credit Ratings
Reinhart et al. (2003) show that there is a strong relationship between external debt and
credit ratings. In order to present some empirical evidence for the e↵ect of inequality on the
creditworthiness of sovereign bonds, we follow an approach similar to that in Reinhart et
al. (2003). We use the following specification to estimate the e↵ect of inequality on credit
5They show that this relationship is robust using various credit-score datasets such as Institutional In-
vestor ratings, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s.
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scores:
Credit Scorei,t = ↵0 + ↵1Ginii,t 1 + ↵2Debt-to-GDPi,t 1
+ ↵3GDP per capitai,t 1 + ui + zt + errori,t (2.1)
To measure the creditworthiness of sovereign bonds, we use the Fitch credit ratings data for
long-term bonds that are issued under foreign currency. This dataset covers a period between
1994 and 2012. For income inequality, we use the Gini indices provided by the Standardized
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt, 2009). This is an unbalanced panel
dataset that has information on inequality for 153 countries covering 1960 to 2012. Debt-to-
GDP ratio is the external debt-to-GDP ratio from the Reinhart-Rogo↵ series that extends
until 2010. Most of this dataset comes from IMF’s Standard Data Dissemination Service,
and it is defined as the outstanding amount of those actual current liabilities that require
payments of principal and/or interest that residents of an economy owe to non-residents
(Statistics, 2003). The GDP per capita series is from the World Bank, and we take its
log for this estimation. The Net foreign assets-to-GDP (NFA/GDP) data used in Table
1 are from the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007). This series includes net foreign assets (NFA) using FDI or equity assets and liabilities
estimated using di↵erent methodologies. NFA is defined as the sum of the net debt position,
the net equity position and the net FDI position in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001). In order
to perform a regression using the credit ratings, we assign a numerical value similar to that
in Cantor and Packer (1996) and Reinhart (2002). Table 28 shows the conversion of the
ratings to scores in Appendix A.3.
We expect to obtain a negative coe cient on Gini and debt-to-GDP ratio and a positive
coe cient on GDP per capita. This implies that higher inequality in country i at time t  1
reduces the credit score in the next period. The credit score of a country shows how risky
that country’s bond is, and higher inequality increases the riskiness, which is reflected by a
lower credit score.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the variables used for the regression sample,
which covers the period 1994-2010 and contains 45 countries. A couple of di↵erences stand
out when we compare observations of emerging markets and advanced economies. First,
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Table 1: Country ratings, debt, income inequality, GDP per capita and net foreign
assets
Country Average Average external Average Average Average
Fitch Rating debt/GDP Inequality GDP per capita NFA/GDP
Emerging market economies
Argentina CCC-/CCC 72.49 45.19 4,483 -21.82
Bolivia CCC+/B- 55.64 50.16 1,086 -64.71
Brazil B+/BB- 28.82 50.22 4,739 -32.47
Bulgaria BB-/BB 85.21 28.38 3,613 -53.71
Chile BBB+/A- 47.71 49.34 7,131 -30.29
China BBB+/A- 12.99 48.27 1,573 8.65
Colombia BB/BB+ 30.64 50.38 3,386 -25.00
Costa Rica BB- 29.18 44.08 4,680 -21.82
Dominican Rep. CCC+ 26.71 45.80 3,928 -35.65
Ecuador CCC-/CCC 49.55 50.02 3,005 -49.82
Egypt, Arab Rep. BB/BB+ 33.13 35.43 1,220 -11.76
El Salvador BB-/BB 40.51 45.47 2,698 -38.53
Ghana B-/B 75.86 40.01 504 -53.53
India BB/BB+ 19.45 49.57 762 -19.71
Indonesia B/B+ 65.47 55.45 1,283 -60.76
Korea, Rep. BBB+/A- 31.30 31.60 16,643 -12.94
Malaysia BBB-/BBB 46.50 47.61 5,296 -21.18
Mexico BB/BB+ 30.22 47.03 7,586 -34.94
Nigeria B+ 18.33 42.46 920 -57.76
Panama BB/BB+ 56.91 49.64 4,747 -77.94
Peru BB-/BB 40.70 50.92 3,038 -41.59
Philippines BB-/BB 62.05 50.79 1,195 -42.29
Romania BB- 38.69 30.06 4,447 -28.47
Russia BB 43.34 30.31 4,928 1.24
Sri Lanka CCC+/B- 44.52 41.16 1388 -45.24
Thailand BB+/BBB- 46.69 52.70 2,623 -39.59
Turkey B/B+ 43.44 45.29 6,584 -35.29
Uruguay B+/BB- 43.91 43.18 5,447 -11.53
Venezuela B/B+ 35.65 41.59 5,500 5.71
Advanced economies
Australia AA-/AA 59.96 31.32 30,7901 -54.47
Canada AA/AA+ 69.65 30.18 30,870 -18.47
Denmark AA/AA+ 96.08 22.40 43,164 -12.53
Finland AA-/AA 72.71 22.35 29,175 -46.24
Greece BBB/BBB+ 93.64 33.64 19,689 -53.94
Hungary BBB-/BBB 85.08 28.36 9,881 -81.76
Italy A+/AA- 84.03 33.60 29,355 -17.53
Japan AA-/AA 33.66 28.38 34,743 33.94
New Zealand AA-/AA 84.00 32.38 27,242 -84.35
Norway AA+ 44.65 23.41 57,064 38.59
Poland BB/BB+ 41.43 30.01 6,960 -39.41
Portugal A-/A 138.62 35.05 17,497 -59.29
Singapore AA/AA+ 154.52 42.92 25,595 1.78
Spain AA/AA+ 90.52 32.88 23,920 -47.76
Sweden AA- 92.11 23.39 34,421 -25.41
United States AA+ 60.68 36.80 41,165 -14.76
List of countries used in the panel regression. Time period covers 1994-2010. Data sources from
left to right: Fitch, Rainhart-Rogo↵ series, SWIID, the World Bank and the External Wealth of
Nations Mark II database.
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emerging markets have low ratings even though their debt-to-GDP ratios are not very high.
When the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP is considered, emerging markets are, on average,
more indebted than advanced countries. Second, they also have higher income inequality
and lower GDP per capita than advanced economies have.
We estimate equation 2.1 using year (zt) and country (ui) fixed e↵ects. We are interested
in analyzing the e↵ect of inequality that varies over time; therefore, country fixed e↵ects will
control for time-invariant characteristics unique to a country. In the first specification, we
find that an increase in a country’s external debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with lower
creditworthiness in the next period. This is a standard result in the literature, as well. In
the second specification, we introduce GDP per capita in log terms, and we find that an
increase in income is associated with an increase in country’s creditworthiness. Finally, the
last specification shows the relationship between income inequality and credit ratings. We
find that an increase in Gini index is negatively associated with the creditworthiness in the
next period. The estimate is significant at ten percent and robust to country and time fixed
e↵ects. In order to get an economic interpretation of the estimates, we do a simple back-of-
the-envelope calculation based on the third specification. The median score in the sample
is 13, which corresponds to BB+. We estimate the third specification separately for each
country. Then, we increase each variable by its one standard deviation and compare their
e↵ects on the score for each country. We find that, on average, a one standard deviation
increase in external debt reduces the credit score by 0.97 and a one standard deviation
increase in log GDP increases the credit score by only 0.01 point. On the other hand, a
one standard deviation increase in Gini reduces the credit score by 0.21 point. The largest
e↵ect comes from the external debt-to-GDP, but the change in the Gini index also has a
substantial e↵ect.
2.2.2 Income Inequality over the Business Cycle
In order to support our theory that income inequality plays a role in default decisions, we
also need to determine whether there is countercyclical inequality over the business cycle.
Using household-level data from several countries, Krueger et al. (2010) show that during
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Table 2: Panel regressions explaining creditworthiness with debt ratios,
GDP per capita and inequality
Dependent Variable: Score of country i in year t.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
External debt-to-GDP at t  1  0.0221⇤⇤⇤  0.0146⇤⇤⇤  0.0122⇤⇤
(0.0057) (0.0050) (0.0048)
GDP per capita at t  1   9.5976⇤⇤⇤ 10.0130⇤⇤⇤
(2.5606) (2.5013)
Gini at t  1  0.0698⇤
(0.0360)
Year fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
No of countries 45 45 45
N 568 568 568
Sample period is between 1994 and 2010. The dependent variable is the credit
score of country i in year t. Estimation is by robust standard errors. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP is in logs. (***,**,* represent
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.)
recessions, earnings inequality increases.6 We perform a similar exercise using our country-
level data. We use the countries that have continuous series for Gini and GDP, leaving
us with 77 countries. We compute the correlation between detrended GDP and inequality
and find that, on average, inequality is countercyclical over the business cycle, with a mean
correlation equal to  0.02. This result is robust to using the Gini series from The World
Bank, as well. In this sample, there are only 46 countries and the mean correlation is equal
to  0.03. Both results support the idea inequality is, on average, countercyclical over the
business cycle in our sample.
6They have several inequality measures, such as Gini coe cient, variance of logs, 50/10 and 90/50 per-
centile ratios, and the countries they study are Canada, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Russia, Spain, Sweden and
the USA.
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2.3 MODEL
In this section, we present a model economy in order to structurally analyze the role of in-
equality in sovereign debt default. Our model is similar to the model presented by Arellano
(2008) and belongs to the class of models in the standard framework of Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981). We consider a discrete time, small open economy inhabited by heterogeneous agents
that are hand-to-mouth and di↵er in the stochastic endowments they receive. The endow-
ment is subject to aggregate output and inequality shocks that cannot be completely insured
against. There is a benevolent government that represents the preferences of households and
has access to international markets. The government can issue one-period bonds to foreign
lenders and rebate the proceeds of the debt operations to the households. The government
can choose to default fully on its debt at any time, because contracts are not enforceable.
The penalty for default is that the economy is forced into financial autarky for a period of
time, and there is an exogenous drop in output. Now, we move on to the details of the
model.
2.3.1 Households
There are two types of infinitely-lived households indexed by i = 1, 2, and their preferences
over consumption of the good, ct, is assumed to be
u(cit) =
ci,1  t
1    (2.2)
where   is the constant relative risk-aversion parameter, and   > 0 and   6= 1. The type 1
household receives a stochastic stream of a tradable good, (1+ )y2 , and type 2 receives
(1  )y
2 ,
where y and   denote output and inequality, respectively. The output y and the inequality
  follow a Markov process with a transition function f (y0,  0|y,  ). Households also receive
an equal amount of transfer from (or pay taxes on goods to) the benevolent government in
a lump sum fashion. Households live hand-to-mouth, which means they do not make any
individual saving or borrowing decisions.
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2.3.2 Government
The government of the economy can trade one-period, non-state contingent bonds with
foreign lenders that are risk neutral and competitive. As in a standard default model,
when the government defaults, the economy faces two types of exogenous default penalties:
direct output costs and a temporary exclusion from borrowing in the debt markets. The
government’s goal is to maximize social utility, which is the expected discounted sum of
lifetime utilities of both types with equal weights given as
E0
1X
t=0
 t

u(c1t ) + u(c
2
t )
 
, (2.3)
where   denotes the discount parameter and   2 (0, 1). The government makes two decisions
in this model. First, it decides whether to repay or default on its existing debt. Second,
conditional on not defaulting, it chooses the amount of one-period bonds, B0, to issue or buy.
If the government chooses to buy bonds, the price it needs to pay is given as q(B0, y,  ). The
discount bonds, B0, can take a positive or negative value. If it is negative, this means that
the government borrows  q(B0, y,  )B0 amounts of period t goods and promises to pay B0
units of goods in the next period, if it does not default. Similarly, if B0 is positive, then this
implies that the government saves q(B0, y,  )B0 amounts of period t goods and will receive
B0 units of goods in the next period. The bond price function q(B0, y,  ) depends on the size
of the bonds, B0, income shock, y, and inequality shock, q. Government internalizes how its
borrowing decisions a↵ect the default risk and the price of the bond.
When the government chooses to repay its debt, the resource constraint for household 1
is
c1 =
(1 +  )y
2
+
B   q(B0, y,  )B0
2
, (2.4)
and the resource constraint for household 2 is
c2 =
(1   )y
2
+
B   q(B0, y,  )B0
2
. (2.5)
The economy faces three types of uncertainty that cannot be insured away with non-state-
contingent bonds. The first one is the dispersion in incomes induced by shocks to  . The
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second one is the output shock y that a↵ects the aggregate output in the economy. Finally,
the third one is the endogenous default risk. The goal of the government is to maximize the
expected utilities of households, and it achieves this goal by trying to equalize the marginal
utilities of consumption between households and across time. One government policy is to
choose optimal B0 that satisfies its goal, and the level of existing debt and the size of the
shocks are crucial for this decision. As debt accumulates, it becomes harder to roll it over
because of increasing default risk.
When the government chooses to default, consumption of the types are:
c1 =
1 +  
2
yd (2.6)
and
c2 =
(1   )
2
yd, (2.7)
where yd is the level of output in default and yd = y   (y). The penalty is a function of
the output such that (y) = min{y,max{0, d0y + d1y2}}. The default penalty is higher, if
default happens in the good states of the world. This default penalty structure has been
used in many papers in the literature, such as Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012b).
2.3.3 Foreign Creditors
Foreign creditors can perfectly monitor the state of the economy and have perfect information
about the shock processes. They can borrow loans from international credit markets at a
constant interest rate r > 0, which is the risk-free interest rate for this model. Taking the
bond price function q(B0, y0,  ) as given, they choose loans B0 that maximize their expected
profits  , given as
  = q(B0, y,  )B0   1   (B
0, y,  )
1 + r
B0, (2.8)
where  (B0, y,  ) is the probability of default and it is determined endogenously.
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q(B0, y,  ) =
8><>:
1
1+r B
0   0
1  (B0,y, )
1+r B
0 < 0.
The price function depends on the sign of B0. It is never optimal to default when the
government saves (B0   0), so in that case, the price is a constant function of the risk-free
interest rate. On the other hand, if the government borrows (B0 < 0), then the price reflects
the default probability. This implies that as the default probability increases, the price of
the bond falls.
2.3.4 Timing
The timing in the model is as follows.
1. The government starts with initial assets B.
2. The output shock y and the inequality shock   are realized.
3. The government decides whether to repay its debt obligations or default.
a. If the government decides to repay, then taking as given the bond price schedule
q(B0, y,  ), the government chooses B0 subject to the resource constraint. Then
creditors, taking q(B0, y,  ) as given, choose B0. Finally, households consume c1 and
c2 with respect to their types.
b. If the government chooses to default, then the economy is in financial autarky and
remains in autarky in the next period with probability ✓. Households simply consume
their endowments.
2.3.5 Recursive Equilibrium
We focus on a recursive equilibrium, in which there is no enforcement. Based on the foreign
creditors’ problem, government’s debt demand is met as long as the gross return on the bond
equals (1 + r). Given loan size B0, inequality state   and income state y, the bond price is
q(B0, y,  ) =
1   (B0, y,  )
1 + r
. (2.9)
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The value function for the government that has the option to default or pay its debt is
given as vo(B, y,  ). Government chooses the option that maximizes the welfare of agents.
The default option will be optimal only if the government has debt. The value of default is
denoted by the function vd(y,  ), and the value of repayment is denoted by vc(B, y,  ).
vo(B, y,  ) = max
c,d
{vc(B, y,  ), vd(y,  )}. (2.10)
The value of default is expressed by
vd(y,  ) = u
✓
(1 +  )ydef
2
◆
+ u
✓
(1   )ydef
2
◆
+  
Z
 0
[✓vo(0, y0,  0) + (1  ✓)vd(y0,  0)]f(y0,  0|y,  )d( 0, y0). (2.11)
Under default, individuals only consume their income. The government can gain access to
debt markets with probability ✓, and the economy stays in autarky with probability 1   ✓.
The transition probabilities are given by the joint density function, f . Similarly, the value
of staying in contract is
vc(B, y,  ) = max
B0
u
✓
(1 +  )y   q(B0, y,  )B0 +B
2
◆
+ u
✓
(1   )y   q(B0, y,  )B0 +B
2
◆
+  
Z
y0, 0
vo(B0, y0,  0)f(y0,  0|y,  )d( 0, y0). (2.12)
If the government chooses to repay its debt, the value function for this choice reflects the
future options for default and staying in contract. The government chooses the optimal bond
contract that maximizes the sum of utilities of the households and expected discounted future
value of option.
We can characterize the government’s default policy by default and repayment sets. Let
A(B) be the set of y and   for which repayment is optimal when assets are B, such that
A(B) =
 
(y,  ) 2 (Y, ) : vc(B, y,  )   vd(y,  ) , (2.13)
and let D(B) = A˜(B) be the set of y,   for which default is optimal for a level of assets B:
D(B) =
 
(y,  ) 2 (Y, ) : vc(B, y,  ) < vd(y,  ) . (2.14)
Proposition 1. Given an output shock y, inequality shock   and bond positions B1 < B2 
0, if default is optimal for B2 then default will be optimal for B1, and the probability of
default at equilibrium satisfies  (B1, y,  ) >  (B2, y,  ).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
This proposition formally states a feature of the model that Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)
also have. It shows that in equilibrium default sets expand and the probability of default
increases as the level of debt in a country increases. The following proposition states that
equilibrium bond price decreases as the level of debt increases.
Proposition 2. Given an output shock y, inequality shock   and bond positions B1 < B2 
0, equilibrium bond price satisfies q(B1, y,  )  q(B2, y,  ).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.2.
Now we define the recursive equilibrium for this economy. Let s = {B, y,  } be the set
of aggregate states for the economy.
Definition 1. The recursive equilibrium for this economy is defined as a set of policy func-
tions for (i) consumptions c1(s), c2(s); (ii) government’s asset holdings B0(s), repayment
sets A(B), and default sets D(B); and (iii) the price function for bonds q(B0, y,  ) such that:
1. Agents’ consumption c1(s) and c2(s) satisfy the resource constraints, taking the govern-
ment policies as given.
2. The government’s policy functions B0(s), repayment sets A(B), and default sets D(B)
satisfy the government optimization problem, taking the bond price function q(B0, y,  )
as given.
3. Bonds prices q(B0, y,  ) reflect the government’s default probabilities and default proba-
bilities satisfy creditors’ expected zero profits.
In equilibrium, the bond price function should satisfy both the government’s optimization
problem and the expected zero profits in the lenders’ problem. As mentioned, the probability
of default endogenously a↵ects the bond price. Using the default sets, we can express the
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probability of default such that:
 (B0, y,  ) =
Z
D(B0)
f(y0,  0|y,  )d(y0,  0). (2.15)
When default sets are empty, default is never optimal at the asset level B0, so the probability
of default equals zero, independent of the realized shock. When D(B0) = (Y, ), government
always chooses to default for all shock levels. Default sets are shrinking in assets.
2.4 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION
2.4.1 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we describe the estimation procedure for the shock processes and then explain
the calibration strategy. We use the model to analyze the debt dynamics in Argentina
between 1990-2002, quantitatively. Focusing on an Argentine default episode enables us to
compare our results with the ones in the existing literature.
2.4.1.1 Calibration and Functional Forms We solve the model assuming that both
output and inequality shocks are in play. We call this the benchmark model. In the bench-
mark model, output and inequality shocks are modeled as a VAR process. Next, in order
to quantify the role of each shock and to assess the importance of the shocks in matching
the high volatilities and particularly high default rates observed in emerging economies, we
solve the model subject to only one shock at a time. Model II has only output shocks, and
we assume that output follows an AR(1) process. Model III has only inequality shocks and,
again, the inequality shock is modeled as an AR(1) process.
In the benchmark model, we assume that the VAR process for log output and inequality
is as follows:24 log(yt)
 t
35 =
24 cy
c 
35+
24 ⇢yy ⇢y 
⇢ y ⇢  
3524 log(yt 1)
 t 1
35+
24 "yt
" t
35 ,
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where 24 cy
c 
35 =
24I  
24 ⇢yy ⇢y 
⇢ y ⇢  
353524 µy
µ 
35
" =
24 "yt
" t
35
E ["] = 0 and V ar ["] =
24  2y  y 
  y  2 
35 .
The estimated values are derived from Argentina’s GDP and income inequality data
between 1991Q1 and 2005Q2. We use real output in quarterly, seasonally adjusted, real
series and covering the period 1993Q1 to 2001Q4 from the dataset in Arellano (2008).7
We take logs of GDP and detrend these series using an HP filter. The data pertaining
to inequality are constructed using the distribution of income series in World Development
Indicators provided by the World Bank. We choose the same period as for GDP. In order
to construct the inequality measure, we compute the total income share of the upper 50th
percentile and lower 50th percentile. Then, we take the di↵erence of the income shares and
divide it by two, which gives us the dispersion from the mean income. Since only annual
data are available, we adopt the Boots-Feibes-Lisman method to disaggregate the annual
data into quarterly data. Both output and inequality shocks are then discretized into a
21-state Markov chain, using Tauchen (1986).
The discount factor  , and default penalty parameters d0 and d1 are jointly calibrated
to target a default probability of 3 percent, debt-to-GDP ratio of 5.53 percent and mean
spread of 6.23. We set the probability of reentry to 0.25, which implies it takes a year to
gain access to bond markets.8
7Arellano (2008) uses the data provided by the Ministery of Finance of Argentina.
8The calibrated value of   and the value of ✓ are close to the values used in the default literature. For
instance, Yue (2010) assumes that   = 0.72, and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) assume that   = 0.8. The
value of parameter ✓ implies that, on average, autarky takes four quarters, assuming that the distribution of
default lengths is exponential (Tomz and Wright (2007) and Pitchford and Wright (2011)). Dias et al. (2007)
empirically show that it takes 5.7 years, on average, for countries to regain partial access to international
capital markets and Gelos et al. (2011) document that average exclusion from the international markets
declined to two years in the 1990s; however, endogenous sovereign default models with exogenous entry to
the debt markets calibrate the parameter ✓ around 0.25. (Arellano (2008) chooses 0.282 and Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006) choose 0.10).
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Table 3 shows the parameters that we use for the benchmark model’s calibration. We set
the risk-free interest rate to 1.7 percent to match the US five-year Treasury bond quarterly
yield. The risk-aversion parameter   is set to 2, as it is standard in the macro literature. We
also report the estimates of the parameters in the stochastic shock process. Note that the
correlation of the output at t and the inequality at t  1, ⇢y , is negative. This means that
high inequality generates low output in the next period. Similarly, since ⇢ y is equal to zero,
the output in the previous quarter does not a↵ect the inequality in the current period. This
relationship between inequality and output is not unique to Argentina. We find that other
frequently defaulting economies, such as Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador
and Uruguay, also have similar results in terms of the signs of the estimates. These results
are reported in Table 29 in the Appendix A.3.
Table 3: A priori parameters for model I
Name Parameters Description
Risk-free interest rate r = 1.7% US 5-year bond quarterly yield
Risk aversion   = 2
Probability of reentry ✓ = 0.25
Stochastic structure

⇢yy ⇢y 
⇢ y ⇢  
 
=

0.95  0.38
0.00 0.95
 
Argentina’s GDP
 2y  y 
  y  2 
 
=

0.0003  0.0001
 0.0001 0.0001
 
and income inequality
cy
c 
 
=

0.12
0.01
 
Table 4: Calibrated parameters for model I
Name Parameters Calibrated Target Value Target
Parameter
Discount rate   0.925 Default probability 3 percent
Default penalty d0 -0.691 Debt service-to-GDP 5.45 percent
d1 0.095 Mean spread 6.23
For Model II, we remove the stochastic inequality shocks by setting the level of inequality
to the mean inequality up to the default episode. This corresponds to setting   equal to
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0.66. The stochastic process for output is assumed to be a log-normal AR(1) process such
that
log(yt) = ⇢ylog(yt 1) + ✏yt, (2.16)
where E[✏yt] = 0 and E[✏2yt] =  
2
y , which are estimated from Argentina’s GDP. We again
discretize the output process into a 21-state Markov chain using the Tauchen method. We
keep all else the same as in the benchmark model. Table 5 presents the parameters for the
second model.
Table 5: A priori parameters for model II
Name Parameters Description
Risk-free interest rate r = 1.7% US 5-year bond quarterly yield
Risk aversion   = 2
Discount rate   = 0.925
Default penalty d0 =  0.691
d1 = 0.095
Probability of reentry ✓ = 0.25
Inequality   = 0.66 Mean income inequality in Argentina
Stochastic structure ⇢y = 0.9351 Argentina’s GDP
 y = 0.0190
Similarly, we need to estimate the stochastic inequality process for Model III. We estimate
the following AR(1) process:
 t = (1  ⇢ )µ  + ⇢  t 1 + ✏ t, (2.17)
where E[✏ t] = µ  and V ar(✏ t) =  2 , which are estimated from Argentina’s inequality data.
As with Model III, we discretize the inequality process into a 21-state Markov chain using
the Tauchen method. We keep all else the same as in benchmark model. The parameters
for the third model are presented in Table 6.
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Table 6: A priori parameters for model III
Name Parameters Description
Risk-free interest rate r = 1.7% US 5-year bond quarterly yield
Risk aversion   = 2
Discount rate   = 0.925
Default penalty d0 =  0.691
d1 = 0.095
Probability of reentry ✓ = 0.25
Stochastic structure ⇢  = 0.9851 Argentina’s Inequality
   = 0.0037
µ  = 0.38
2.4.2 Model Solution
In this section, we begin with the analysis of the benchmark model’s results and then elab-
orate on the intuition behind the workings of the model. Our solution algorithm is given in
the Appendix A.2.
In our model, the benevolent government has two policy decisions to make: whether
to repay the existing debt or default; and how much to borrow or save using one-period
bonds. The government borrows to help households have smooth consumption and to shift
future consumption to today because the equilibrium interest rate is lower than government’s
discount rate. The level of optimal debt depends on the current assets and the state of the
world. Since lenders have full information about the state of the world and contracts are
not state-dependent, borrowing constraints can bind for the government, particularly in bad
states of the world, such as high inequality and low output. Therefore, we observe that bond
prices depend on the level of assets and the types of shocks that the economy is subject to.
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In the model, since the endowment is shared unequally among households, even in the
absence of the shocks, the poor agents’ marginal utility of consumption is higher than that
of rich agents. An adverse output shock increases both agents’ marginal utility of consump-
tion, but an adverse inequality shock raises the marginal utility of the poor and reduces
the marginal utility of the rich, increasing the dispersion between the marginal utilities of
consumption. Defaults are more likely when there are adverse shocks and high levels of
debt because the lenders o↵er bond contracts that have higher interest rates in these states.
This makes the government borrowing-constrained and imposes large taxes on households
in order to finance the debt. An adverse inequality shock exacerbates the burden of the
tax, particularly on the poor, because it increases the poor’s marginal utility of consumption
disproportionately. In this case, the government can choose to default and use default as
a redistribution mechanism. This policy improves welfare because, by eliminating the tax
burden, the government can alleviate the dispersion.
First, we analyze our results related to policy functions and value functions in the bench-
mark model. We report the results based on four di↵erent combinations of output and in-
equality shocks. A low (high) shock is one standard deviation below (above) its mean for
each type of shock. The level of assets is denoted as a fraction of GDP. Then, we look at
the business cycle statistics that the model generates.
Figure 1 shows the bond price schedule and the interest rate generated by the model.
On the x-axis we have assets as a fraction of output. Similar to the results presented in the
standard default literature, such as Arellano (2008) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), we
observe that bond prices are an increasing function of assets, such that high levels of debt
entail a low bond price and a high interest rate. Fixing the level of inequality shocks, we
observe that it is easier to borrow during expansions than during recessions. However, the
results also show that the e↵ect of a high output shock can be dominated by the e↵ect of
a high inequality shock. In other words, an economy that is subject to both high output
and high inequality shocks can have a bond price that is lower than that when there are low
output and low inequality shocks.
The lower panel in Figure 1 shows the annual equilibrium interest rates generated by the
model. The interest rate is calculated as 1/q(B0, y,  ) 1. Inequality shocks generate another
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Figure 1: Bond prices and interest rate (model I)
source of risk that is reflected in interest rates. The highest level of borrowing is possible
when there is high output and low inequality in the economy. Government borrowing is
subject to higher interest rates, even for small amounts of debt that are above the level of
default in high-inequality and or low-output states.
The top panel in Figure 2 shows the saving policy function conditional on not defaulting.
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Our results show that the government borrows more in expansions and when there is low
inequality. This result is consistent with the countercyclical interest rates, since it becomes
more costly to borrow in bad states of the world. The bottom panel of Figure 2 is the value
function for the option to default or repay as a function of assets. Again, inequality plays a
significant role in the default decision. The flat regions of the value function show the range
of debt for which default is optimal. The value functions show that the highest debt can be
supported, when there is high output and low inequality in the economy.
2.4.3 Business Cycle Results
2.4.3.1 Data First, we document the business cycle characteristics of the Argentine
economy. For the business cycle statistics, we use real output, consumption and trade
balance data in quarterly, seasonally adjusted, real series for the period 1993Q1 and 2001Q4
from the dataset in Arellano (2008).9 We take logs of GDP and consumption series and
apply a linear trend on these series following Arellano (2008).10 The trade balance data are
a fraction of GDP. We also borrow Arellano (2008)’s spread data, which are defined as the
di↵erence between the interest rate in Argentina and the yield of the five-year U.S. treasury
bond. The interest rate series is EMBI for Argentina and starts from 1983Q3. For the mean
and standard deviation of the spread we use the period between 1993Q1 and 2001Q1. The
inequality series is the one we constructed to generate a shock process, as explained in the
previous section.
Table 7 presents the business cycle statistics of all the data available up to the default
episode that started on December 26, 2001. Consumption and output in the first column
show the deviations from the trend, and the other values are in levels in the first quarter
of 2002. Relative to the average inequality in the series, in the default episode, inequality
increased by 8.6 percent. The second column shows the standard deviations up to the
default episode. We find that consumption is more volatile than output. The third and the
fourth columns present the correlations of each variable with the output and the interest rate
9Arellano (2008) uses the data provided by the Ministery of Finance of Argentina.
10Analysis using HP filtered series (with smoothing parameter 1600) also produces similar results for
correlations.
28
Figure 2: Savings and value functions (model I)
spread, respectively. It has been shown that emerging market economies are characterized
by countercyclical spread rates and net exports. Also, their consumption is highly correlated
with output. We see similar empirical results for Argentina in column 3. In addition, we show
that inequality is countercyclical with output, so the economy has high inequality during
recessions. The interest rate spread is negatively correlated with consumption and output,
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and positively correlated with trade balance. The data show that inequality is positively
correlated with the spread, which implies that inequality increases during times of risky
borrowing.
Table 7: Business cycle statistics for Argentina
Default episode
x: Q1-2002 std(x) corr(x, y) corr(x, rc)
Interest rate spread (%) 28.60 2.77 -0.88
Trade balance (% of GDP) 9.90 1.75 -0.64 0.70
Consumption (% deviation from trend) -16.01 8.59 0.98 -0.89
Output (% deviation from trend) -14.21 7.78 -0.88
Inequality (% deviation from mean ineq.) 8.6 1.71 -0.23 0.55
2.4.3.2 Simulation Results Next, we move on to the business cycle statistics generated
by the benchmark model and evaluate the performance of the model with Argentine data.
The upper panel of Table 8 presents the simulation results for the benchmark model, which
generates a default probability of 2.80, debt-to-GDP ratio of 5.53 percent and mean spread
of 4.90. High volatility of interest rates is a consequence of high default probability. We
observe a large increase in the spread during default episodes, which is close to the data.
In Argentina, in the couple of months following the default, quarterly spreads reached to
5,000-6,000 basis points. The model also generates large drops in consumption and output
during default episodes. Inequality increases by 9.09 percent relative to its mean, which is
also close to the increase observed during the default episode (8.60 percent). The model
can also generate high volatility in consumption and output. The volatility of inequality is
slightly lower than the value observed in the data.
In terms of correlations with output, the simulations can generate a positive correlation
with consumption and a negative correlation with the interest rate spread.11 We also obtain
a negative correlation between output and trade balance. The reason is that when there
are only output shocks, households can consume more than the level of the output during
11See Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) for the role of
countercyclical interest rates in emerging markets.
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Table 8: Simulation results for the benchmark model
Default episodes std(x) corr(x,y) corr(x, rc)
Model I: Shocks to output and inequality
Interest rate spread (%) 59.82 9.94  0.20 -
Trade balance (% of GDP)  0.01 0.91  0.12 0.29
Total Consumption (% deviation from trend)  7.19 5.82 0.99  0.25
Output (% deviation from trend)  7.29 5.63    0.20
Inequality (% deviation from mean ineq.) 7.45 0.70  0.28 0.16
Other Statistics
Mean debt (percent output) 5.53 Mean spread 4.90
Default probability 2.80
expansions because the government can borrow easily. On the other hand, when there is
a recession, borrowing is constrained; therefore, the consumption is less than the output.
This generates a countercyclical trade balance over the business cycle. We see a positive
correlation between the spread and the trade balance. Since the spread reflects the risk
due to both inequality and output shocks, it is more correlated with the bad states of the
world, in which the government is more likely to face borrowing constraints and experience
large trade balances. As we expected, inequality is negatively correlated with output and
positively correlated with the spread. Table 9 shows our model’s performance relative to
Arellano (2008). The benchmark model does quantitatively a similar job with Arellano
(2008) in terms of matching the data.
We solve and simulate Model II and Model III, in order to assess the role of output shocks
and inequality shocks in the default risk. The simulation results for Model II and Model III
are given in Table 10. We find that the default probability is around 0.52 percent when there
are output shocks and 0.32 percent when there are inequality shocks. We obtain a probability
of default when the economy is subject to output shocks that is slightly higher than the model
with inequality shocks because the default penalties are di↵erent in two models. In the case
of output shocks, the default penalty increases in good states of the world and decreases in
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Table 9: Simulation results for the benchmark model: comparison with Arellano (2008)
Data Benchmark Model Arellano (2008)
Volatilities
 (c)/ (y) 1.09 1.04 1.10
 (tb)/ (y) 0.17 0.16 0.26
Correlations
corr(y,spread)  0.88  0.20  0.29
corr(y,c) 0.98 0.98 0.97
corr(y,tb)  0.64  0.12  0.25
corr(y,inequality)  0.23  0.28  
corr(spread,c)  0.89  0.25  0.36
corr(spread,tb) 0.70 0.29 0.43
corr(spread,inequality) 0.55 0.16  
Other Statistics
Mean Debt (percent output) 5.53 5.41 5.95
Mean Spread 6.23 4.90 3.54
Default Probability 3.00 2.80 3.00
Table 10: Simulation results for model II and model III
Model II Model III
Default episodes std(x) Default episodes std(x)
Interest rate spread (%) 9.70 1.46 1.78 0.68
Trade balance  0.03 2.15  0.02 0.98
Total Consumption  2.78 5.65  2.92 0.99
Output  8.00 4.46  7.99 0.00
Inequality 0.00 0.00 2.63 1.15
Other Statistics
Mean debt (percent output) 52.76 48.46
Default probability 0.52 0.32
Mean Spread 0.63 0.44
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bad states of the world; thus with smaller penalty and tighter borrowing constraints in bad
states, we observe a larger default rate. On the other hand, in model III the default penalty
is constant across all states because aggregate output is constant. This generates a lower
probability of default in model III because the default cost is higher.
We also find that the default risk in both Model II and Model III is lower than that
in the benchmark model. This is strong evidence that shows that the amplification e↵ect
comes from the underlying joint shock process. The reason behind this result is the VAR(1)
process that we systematically estimated from the Argentine data. Based on the estimated
process, it is more likely to have adverse output and inequality shocks together. Moreover,
high inequality at time t   1 leads to lower output at time t. These characteristics play an
important role in altering the expectations of foreign lenders and the government about the
future state of the economy. An adverse inequality shock not only amplifies the e↵ect of an
adverse output shock today, but also generates pessimism that the recession with increasing
inequality may be long-lasting.12 As a result, foreign lenders ask for a higher premium, even
for smaller levels of debt. This increases the borrowing constraints on the government, and
default becomes an optimal decision.
2.5 ALTERNATIVE CALIBRATION
We obtain the main results regarding the e↵ects of inequality shocks using Argentine data.
In this section, we calibrate the model for Mexico. Our goal in this exercise is to see whether
the model can match the business cycle statistics of Mexico and whether the model can
also explain di↵erences in consumption volatilities across income groups that we observe
in the data. Since we do not have the consumption distribution data for Argentina, we
focus on Mexican economy for this exercise. Like Argentina, Mexico experienced several
default episodes. We focus on the crises in the last century when we compute the default
12In order to disentangle the e↵ect of inequality on output in the next period, when we generate the
Markov process, we assume that ⇢y  = 0 and ⇢ y = 0 . Under this specification, we find that the probability
of default falls to 1.96 percent. This result shows that two thirds of the default risk comes from the fact that
the covariances of the shocks are negative.
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probability. According to Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2011), Mexico experienced external default
or restructuring in 1914, 1928 and 1982 and it was near default in 1994. Depending on
whether we include the last incidence, we get a default probability between 3-4 percent;
therefore we choose 3.5 percent as the default rate.13
Table 11: A priori parameters for Mexico
Name Parameters Description
Risk-free interest rate r = 1.7% US 5-year bond quarterly yield
Risk aversion   = 2
Probability of reentry ✓ = 0.25
Stochastic structure

⇢yy ⇢y 
⇢ y ⇢  
 
=

0.90  0.17
0.02 0.94
 
Mexico GDP
 2y  y 
  y  2 
 
=

0.0001 0.0002
0.0002 0.00005
 
and income inequality
cy
c 
 
=

0.05
0.02
 
We repeat the steps for Argentina when we estimate the shock processes for Mexico.
Table 11 shows a-priori parameters that we used in the simulations in order to obtain the
business cycle statistics for Mexico. We use the same values for the risk-free interest rate and
the risk aversion parameter as in the previous sections. The stochastic shock processes come
from the VAR estimations based on Mexico’s GDP and income distribution data. The data
cover the period between 1995-2012. We find the estimate for ⇢y  is negative and it implies
that inequality in the previous period reduces the output in the current period. However
the covariances of the errors are not negative, which implies that Mexico is more likely to
receive a low inequality shock together with a low output shock.
We follow the same calibration strategy. Table 12 shows the calibrated parameter values.
We jointly calibrate the discount rate ( ) and the output cost in autarky parameters (d0 and
d1), in order to match the default probability of 3.5 percent, debt service-to-GDP ratio of
13If we count the number of default or restructuring episodes starting from the country’s year of indepen-
dence, then we consider the period between 1828 and 2015 for Mexico. There are in total 9 crises episodes,
which lead to a higher default rate around 4-5 percent. The data on external debt crisis are from (Reinhart
and Rogo↵, 2011). An external debt crisis is defined as the failure to meet the principal or interest payment
on the due date by Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2011). The episodes also include instances where the principal or
interest payment is rescheduled at less favorable terms than the original contract.
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Table 12: Calibrated parameters for Mexico
Name Parameters Calibrated Target Value Target
Parameter
Discount rate   0.90 Default probability 3.5 percent
Default penalty d0 -1.37 Debt service-to-GDP 4.5 percent
d1 0.15 Mean spread 4.2
4.5 percent and the mean spread 4.2 in Mexico.14 We compute the business cycle statistics
using quarterly seasonally adjusted real GDP, real consumption and trade balance data from
FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We detrend the consumption and output series
and we focus on the period between 1993q1 and 2012q4.
The simulation results are given in Table 13. In terms of matching the targets, the
model does well except that it generates higher debt service-to-GDP ratio than we observe
in the data. We see that the model can match the main business cycle characteristics for
Mexico, such as spreads that are countercyclical, consumption that is procyclical over the
business cycle and consumption that is highly correlated with output. We get high volatility
of consumption relative to output. Also, the trade balance is positively correlated with the
spread; however, it is acyclical with output.
We can also compute consumption volatilities for the rich and poor households using
this model. We use Mexico Household Income and Expenditure Survey data between 1992
and 2008. Since the survey is not conducted every year, we interpolated the data for the
missing years. We compute the consumption of the upper and lower 50 percentile of the
households in order to make the statistics comparable with the model. In the data, we find
that consumption volatility of the poor household is slightly higher than the rich household’s
and the ratio of volatilities is 1.09. Since survey data set is annual, using the simulated results
and aggregating the data we convert the consumption of the poor and rich households to
14We borrow debt service-to-GDP statistic from Cuadra et al. (2010). Debt service to GDP data cover the
years from 1980 to 2007 and the spread covers the period from 2000q1 to 2012q4. We compute the spread
as the di↵erence between the interest rates on government securities and treasury bills of Mexico and the
U.S., both data are retrieved from FRED database provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Table 13: Business cycle statistics for Mexico
Mexico Simulation Data
corr(spread, y) -0.57 -0.52
corr(spread, tb) 0.44 0.68
corr(spread, tc) -0.72 -0.53
corr(tb, y) 0.01 -0.87
corr(tc, y) 0.86 0.97
std(tc)/std(y) 1.19 1.09
std(cpoor)/std(crich) 1.05 1.10
Targets
Default probability 3.78% 3.5%
Debt service-to-GDP 9.9% 4.5%
Mean spread 4.44 4.20
Total consumption and trade balance are denoted
by tc and tb, respectively. The consumption
volatilities of the rich and poor are yearly, the rest
of the statistics are at quarterly frequency.
annual frequency. In our model, consumption volatility of the poor households is also higher
than that of the rich and the ratio is close to its data counterpart. Incomplete asset markets
together with income shocks are key for this result. In our model income inequality shocks
amplify the e↵ect of output shocks particularly on the poor households’ endowment. Since
there are no other assets that the households can use to insure against these shocks, poor
households have higher volatility of consumption than rich households.
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2.6 PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAXES
In the previous sections, we assume that government distributes the proceeds of the debt
payments equally between the households. As mentioned above, these proceeds can function
as taxes when they are negative and they can function as transfers, otherwise. Since these
payments are lump sum, the burden (benefit) of taxes (transfers) relative to endowment is
quite di↵erent across the households. Particularly, the burden of lump sum taxes is on the
poor. Therefore, this brings up the question: How would the probability of default change in
an economy if the government could use progressive income taxes to finance the debt when
it is costly to borrow?
We impose the following tax regime:
T (yi) =
8><>:0 B   qB
0   0,
yi    (yi)1 ⌧ B   qB0 < 0.
As ⌧ increases the tax function becomes more progressive, and when ⌧ = 1, both types of
households consume equally. The parameter   is called the shift parameter and determines
the average tax rate. If B   qB0 is positive, the government only distributes the proceeds
of the debt operations across households as transfers similar to the benchmark model. If
B   qB0 is negative, then the government uses the revenues from the taxes to finance the
debt. The budget constraint of the government for the latter case is given as:
T (y1) + T (y2) + B   qB0 = 0. (2.18)
One can solve for   using the budget constraint of the government:
y1    (y1)1 ⌧ + y2    (y2)1 ⌧ +B   qB0 = 0
y    [(y1)1 ⌧ + (y2)1 ⌧ ] + B   qB0 = 0
 [(y1)1 ⌧ + (y2)1 ⌧ ] = y +B   qB0
  =
y +B   qB0
(y1)1 ⌧ + (y2)1 ⌧
.
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The disposable incomes are denoted by y˜i for each type of household i. When B   qB0 < 0,
we get:
y˜1 =  (y1)1 ⌧ ,
=
(y +B   qB0)(y1)1 ⌧
(y1)1 ⌧ + (y2)1 ⌧
.
y˜2 =  (y2)1 ⌧ ,
=
(y +B   qB0)(y2)1 ⌧
(y1)1 ⌧ + (y2)1 ⌧
.
We can write the budget constraints of the households if the government does not choose to
default as:
c1 =
8><>:y
1 + B qB
0
2 B   qB0 > 0,
(y+B qB0)(y1)1 ⌧
(y1)1 ⌧+(y2)1 ⌧ B   qB0  0.
c2 =
8><>:y
2 + B qB
0
2 B   qB0 > 0,
(y+B qB0)(y2)1 ⌧
(y1)1 ⌧+(y2)1 ⌧ B   qB0  0.
If the government chooses to default, we assume that the progressive taxes are in e↵ect. The
budget constraints during autarky are:
c1 =
yd(yd,1)1 ⌧
(yd,1)1 ⌧ + (yd,2)1 ⌧
,
c2 =
yd(yd,2)1 ⌧
(yd,1)1 ⌧ + (yd,2)1 ⌧
.
We recalibrate the model in order to match 3 percent default probability and mean
spread of 6.3, when ⌧ = 015. We simulate the model for five di↵erent values of ⌧ 2
15The calibrated parameters are   = 0.895, d0 =  0.56 and we fix d1 = 0.095.
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Table 14: E↵ect of ⌧1 on the default probability and debt
⌧ = 0 ⌧ = 0.1 ⌧ = 0.20 ⌧ = 0.3 ⌧ = 0.4
Mean debt (% output) 26.32 27.44 28.02 28.65 28.98
Mean spread (%) 5.43 4.78 4.60 4.50 4.28
Probability of default (%) 2.92 2.32 1.85 1.68 1.46
{0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4} and analyze how the progressivity of the tax system a↵ects the proba-
bility of default and debt-to-output ratio. Table 14 shows the results. The model with ⌧ = 0
has mean debt of 26.32 percent. As ⌧ increases, we obtain higher mean debt. Moving from
⌧ = 0 to ⌧ = 0.4, the probability of default decreases from 2.92 percent to 1.68 percent.
The reason is that taxes reduce the dispersion in marginal utilities of consumption between
households, by taxing the rich more than the poor. As the dispersion gets smaller, the gov-
ernment has less incentive to default. Therefore, foreign lenders lend higher levels of debt to
the government and the mean spread declines monotonically.
2.7 CONCLUSION
This paper studies the role of changes in income inequality in sovereign borrowing and de-
fault decisions using a stochastic general equilibrium model with endogenous default risk.
By introducing heterogeneous agents and shocks to the distribution of income, we predict a
default probability of 2.8 percent and also match the business cycle characteristics observed
in the data when calibrated to Argentina. Our model’s contribution is to highlight the re-
distributive e↵ects of default. The model can also explain the di↵erences in consumption
volatilities across di↵erent income groups, which has not been shown in the previous liter-
ature. Our paper emphasizes the role of changes in income inequality as another channel
that leads to debt crises. We show that changes in income inequality can generate default
episodes that coincide with recessions. Since these crisis episodes have long-lasting e↵ects on
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the economy, we believe that the policies we suggest in this paper are critical to preventing
future crises.
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3.0 SOVEREIGN RISK AND PRIVATE CREDIT IN LABOR MARKETS1
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we propose a theory that can explain three observations pertaining to emerging
market economies. First, as Neumeyer and Perri (2005) show, emerging markets are char-
acterized by countercyclical interest rates. Second, during default episodes, there are large
drops in labor and output. Third, Arteta and Hale (2008) show that during sovereign debt
crises, there is a significant decline in foreign credit to private firms. Firms can use private
credit to finance their working capital, and there can be a feedback loop between sovereign
risk and the cost of private credit. In this paper, we investigate the nexus among firms’
labor demand decision, private credit and government’s borrowing decisions, focusing on the
role of labor markets. Particularly, we are interested in how private credit and government’s
default risk are related to the drops in output observed after sovereign defaults.
The stylized empirical facts for emerging economies are presented in Figure 3, focusing
on a subset of countries that includes Argentina, Korea, Greece, and Spain. We look at the
detrended real GDP and employment for these countries. Consistent with the findings in the
literature shown by Li (2011), Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006), we find
that employment tends to move together with real GDP in these four emerging countries
over the business cycle. In addition, in recession, the labor drops with the output drops in
these economies.
In this paper, we examine these features of emerging markets using a stochastic general
equilibrium model in a small open economy. The economy is subject to aggregate uncertainty
about productivity. The problem of the representative households is standard in that they
1This research is a joint work with Kiyoung Jeon.
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Figure 3: GDP and employment in emerging countries
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make consumption and labor decisions that optimize their life time utility subject to a budget
constraint that entails wages, transfers from the government and profits from the firms.
Similar to standard models with endogenous default, there is a benevolent government that
can borrow from foreign lenders by issuing one-period, non-state contingent bonds, which are
not enforceable and the government transfers the proceeds of debt operations to households.
The government’s incentives to borrow comes from the fact that the government tries to help
households have smooth consumption across time, using these transfers. Foreign lenders
extend loans to the government, taking into account the default risk. Endogenous default
risk is associated with the government’s default or repayment decisions and it depends on
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the level of bonds the government would like to issue and the size of the productivity shock.
Default is more likely, if the economy is subject to low TFP shocks and has high levels of
debt because they lead to an increase in the premium that the foreign lenders ask when they
lend to the government. As foreign lenders ask for a higher premium, it becomes harder for
the government to roll over its debt, so it has to incur large taxes on households to finance
the existing debt. If this is the case, then default can become an optimal policy because it
can help eliminate the tax burden and improve households utility. However, the government
faces a trade-o↵. If the government chooses to default, the government is banned from the
loan markets for a temporary period of time. This means government cannot issue bonds to
help households have smooth consumption during this period.
To generate endogenous drops in output, we assume that firm’s production requires the
finance of working capital loans used to pay a fraction of the wage bill. Adopting the working
capital condition from Neumeyer and Perri (2005) enables us to examine the role of labor in
sovereign defaults. Firms maximize their profits by making labor decisions and taking into
account the interest they need to pay on the working capital loans. They demand less labor
as working capital loans become more expensive due to the increase in sovereign default risk.
The drops in labor demand result in lower production. When the government decides to
default on its debt, the firms can still borrow from foreign lenders, but at a high interest
rate, even though the government cannot. In this sense, the high interest rate on working
capital loans acts as a default penalty on firms. This assumption is consistent with the
empirical findings in the literature. Arteta and Hale (2008) show that during sovereign debt
crises, there is a significant decline in foreign credit to private firms. The paper suggests
that the decrease in amount of credit available to private firms can be an important channel
that generates large drops in output observed in defaults.
In addition, we assume that the debtor still has debt arrears following defaults. In a
standard default model such as Arellano (2008), the defaulters start with zero debt when
they again enter into the debt market. However, this assumption does not account for
the debt restructuring in emerging countries. Benjamin and Wright (2009) show that the
creditors lose 44 percent of their lending on average through the renegotiation process after
the default. Partial default makes our model closer to the actual debt restructuring of the
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defaulters. It can play a role as another form of penalty on default because the debt arrears
lower the future value of default, and therefore it a↵ects the decision on default.
The model explains the main features of the business cycles observed in the emerging
markets well, such as countercyclical spreads, countercyclical trade balance, and high con-
sumption and output volatility, when calibrated to Argentine data. In addition, the model
can generate reasonable drops in labor and output in defaults. We also obtain procyclical
labor over the business cycles and the labor volatility is similar to Argentine economy. We
obtain a procyclical labor supply because two things change when the economy is hit by an
adverse TFP shock; first, the shock has a direct e↵ect on production and it reduces output
because productivity is lower and firms demand less labor, which is a standard result of an
RBC model. Second, the shock has an indirect e↵ect on production through the increase
in endogenous default risk. Because the government is more likely to default, the interest
rate on the working capital loan is also higher, which makes the production even more costly
for the firms and it dampens firms’ labor demand even more. Equilibrium wages also drop
because they are inversely related with interest rates and positively related with the TFP
shock. Because we assume that households have Greenwood-Hercovitz-Hu↵man (GHH) type
of preferences, the substitution e↵ect dominates the income e↵ect and the households are
willing to supply less labor.2 Overall this generates even larger drops in output. When
households’ income drops so much due to the decreases in labor income, the government
would like to borrow even more from foreign lenders, so that households can have smooth
consumption. However, since the shocks are persistent, the foreign lenders adjust their ex-
pectations about the future state of the economy, such that they ask for an even higher
premium on the government bonds. This generates a vicious cycle, in which output, labor,
consumption and wages decrease further and it becomes harder for the government to roll
over its debt. Consequently, the government may choose to default to eliminate the tax
burden necessary to finance the existing debt, especially when the level of existing debt is
already very high.
2The advantage of GHH preference specification is that it generates the right comovement between labor
supply and production. GHH specification was introduced by Greenwood et al. (1988) and has been used
in many papers with small open economy models, such as Mendoza (1991), Correia et al. (1995), Neumeyer
and Perri (2005), and many others.
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Our paper is related to the endogenous sovereign default literature that starts with
the seminal paper of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and continues with Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006), Arellano (2008), Pitchford and Wright (2011), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012b) and
Amador and Aguiar (2014), some of which were mentioned above.3 These papers assume
an exogenous output process and penalty in their models. Our paper is closely related to
Mendoza and Yue (2011) in that they consider working capital conditions and endogenous
sovereign default. They also combine the international business cycle model and the sovereign
default model by considering the interaction between households, firms, government and
foreign lenders, as we do in this paper. However, their work is di↵erent than ours in many
dimensions. First, in their model the e ciency loss from sovereign default generates an
endogenous output cost because firms should substitute imported inputs into other imported
or domestic inputs, which are imperfect substitutes. However, in our model the default cost
stems from the interest rate on working capital and the debt renegotiation. In addition,
while their model adopts working capital conditions for imported intermediate goods, our
model use working capital conditions for labor demand. Second, on the firms’ side they
assume that firms are excluded from the international debt market when the government
decides to default. In our model, firms can still access to the international debt markets,
but borrow at a high interest rate. In addition, our paper is related to papers on debt
renegotiation and default such as D’Erasmo (2008), Bi (2008), Benjamin and Wright (2009),
Yue (2010), and Pitchford and Wright (2011). Finally, our paper is related to the literature
that studies the business cycle properties of labor market variables in emerging markets. Li
(2011) explains countercyclical interest rates and procyclical wages in emerging economies
by assuming exogenous default risk. As mentioned above we have endogenous default risk
and working capital conditions in our model that generate fluctuations in labor together
with productivity shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the model and defines
the recursive equilibrium. Section 3.3 discusses the calibration, the quantitative analysis of
the model. Section 3.4 discusses the simulation results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3Also see Panizza et al. (2009), Wright (2011) and Aguiar and Amador (2013) for good reviews of this
literature.
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3.2 MODEL
In this section, we present a model economy in order to understand the role of labor supply
on sovereign debt default. Basically, our model belongs to the class of models in the standard
framework of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), but richer in the sense that it has households,
firms, foreign lenders and the government. We consider a discrete time, small open economy
inhabited by representative households. Households choose optimal consumption and labor
paths that maximize their lifetime utilities subject to the budget constraint. They receive
transfers from the government, wages for supplying labor and profits from the ownership of
the firms. Firms face stochastic TFP shocks and finance working capital before production
takes place similar to Neumeyer and Perri (2005). There is a benevolent government that
represents the preferences of households and has access to international markets. The gov-
ernment can issue one-period bonds to foreign lenders and distribute the proceeds of the
debt payments to the households. The government can choose to default on its debt at any
time, because contracts are not enforceable. The penalty for default is that the government
is forced to stay in financial autarky for a period of time and the firms need to pay higher
interest rates on their working capital. In addition, if the government gains access to the
international bond markets, it needs to pay the debt arrears. That is, we allow for partial
default.
3.2.1 Households
We assume that the households have GHH preferences which are used in open economy
models by many international business cycle literatures. The GHH preferences are often
adapted because they improve the performance of the model in terms of the business cycle
statistics. In addition, these preferences remove the wealth e↵ect on labor supply and the
labor supply is determined independently of intertemporal considerations. The functional
form of preference is:
u(c, l) =
 
c  l!!
 1     1
1   
where ! > 1 and   > 0.
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The households have di↵erent budget constraints that depend on whether the government
is in autarky or not. If the government decides to repay its debt, the household problem is
given as:
max
ct,lt
Et
" 1X
t=0
 tu(ct, lt)
#
subject to ct = wtlt + ⇡t + (Bt   qtBt+1).
If the government is in autarky, the budget constraint becomes ct = wtlt + ⇡t. The optimal
labor supply satisfies that
l! 1t = wt. (3.1)
3.2.2 Firms
Firms choose labor demand that maximizes their profits. Profits are equal to revenues net
of the wage bill and interest payments on working capital loans. Firms have to borrow a
certain fraction of the labor cost in order to complete production.
When the government decides to repay its debt, the interest rate on working capital, rt,
is equal to the interest rate on the government’s debt.
max
lt
ztk
↵l1 ↵t   wtlt   rt✓wtlt
where zt is the TFP shock that is assumed to follow a Markov process with a transition
function f(z0, z). The fraction of the labor cost that needs to be borrowed from foreign
lenders at the interest rate, rt, is denoted by ✓.
When the government chooses to default, the firms’ problem is:
max
lt
ztk
↵l1 ↵t   wtlt   rd✓wtlt,
where rd is the interest rate on working capital loans in default. It will be specified in detail
in the government’s problem.
In addition, we assume that rd is an upper bound on the interest rate on working capital
even when the government decides to repay its debt and the bond price is close to zero.
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From the firm’s problem, the wage should satisfy the following optimality condition
obtained from the firm’s problem:
wt =
8<: 1 ↵1+✓rt ztk↵l ↵t (Repayment)1 ↵
1+✓rd
ztk↵l
 ↵
t (Default).
(3.2)
3.2.3 Government
The government of the economy can trade one period, non-state contingent bonds with
foreign lenders that are risk free and competitive. Unlike standard default models, when the
government defaults, the economy does not face direct output costs, but the government is
in a temporary exclusion from borrowing in the debt markets. When the government gains
access to the debt markets, it needs to pay a fraction of the debt, which is denoted by .
In this sense, we allow for only partial default in our model. The government’s goal is to
maximize the households’ expected lifetime utility, given as:
E0
 1X
t=0
 tu(ct, lt)
 
, (3.3)
where   denotes the discount parameter and   2 (0, 1).
The government makes two decisions in this model. The first one is whether to repay or
default on its existing debt. Second, conditional on not defaulting, it chooses the amount of
one-period bonds, B0 to issue or buy. If the government chooses to buy bonds, the price it
needs to pay is given as q(B0, z). The discount bonds, B0, can take positive or negative values.
If it is negative, it means that the government borrows  q(B0, z)B0 amounts of period t goods
and promises to pay B0 units of goods in the next period, if it does not default. Similarly, if
B0 is positive, then it implies that the government saves q(B0, z)B0 amounts of period t goods
and it will receive B0 units of goods in the next period. The bond price function q(B0, z)
depends on the size of the bonds, B0, and TFP shock, z. Government’s incentive to default
and the price functions are both endogenous.
The government’s value of option is the maximum of value of default (vd) or value of
repayment (vc) and it is given as:
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V (Bt, zt) = max
c,d
 
vc(Bt, zt), v
d(Bt, zt)
 
.
The value of repayment is represented by
vc(Bt, zt) = max
Bt+1
u(ct, lt) +  Et [V (Bt+1, zt+1)]
subject to ct = ztk
↵l1 ↵t   rt✓wtlt +Bt   qt(Bt+1, zt)Bt+1.
If the government chooses to repay its debt, the value function for this choice reflects the
future options for default and staying in contract. The government chooses the optimal
bond contract that maximizes the utility of the households and the discounted future value
of option.
The value of default is given as:
vd(Bt, zt) = u(ct, lt) +  Et
⇥
(1   )vd(Bt, zt+1) +  vc(Bt, zt+1)
⇤
where ct = ztk
↵l1 ↵t   rd✓wtlt
The probability of having access to bond markets in the next period is denoted by  . The
value of default is equal to the utility of household plus the future expected discounted value
that entails the value of default weighted by 1     and value of option in the next period
weighted by  . The value of option has Bt as the state variable because the government
enters into the international debt market with the debt arrears Bt due to debt renegotiation
process.
3.2.4 Foreign Lenders
Foreign creditors can perfectly monitor the state of the economy and have perfect information
about the shock processes. They can borrow loans from international credit markets at a
constant interest rate, r⇤ > 0, which is the risk free interest rate in this model. Taking the
bond price function q(Bt+1, zt) as given, they choose loans Bt+1 that maximize their expected
profits ⇡, given as:
⇡(Bt+1, zt) =
8<: q(Bt+1, zt)Bt+1  
Bt+1
1+r⇤ (if Bt+1   0)
1  (Bt+1,zt)+ (Bt+1,zt) 
1+r⇤ Bt+1   q(Bt+1, zt)Bt+1 (if Bt+1 < 0),
(3.4)
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where  (Bt+1, z) is the probability of default and is determined endogenously.
Because we assume that the market for new sovereign debt is completely competitive,
the foreign investors’ expected profit is zero in equilibrium. Hence, we have the bond price
as following:
qt(Bt+1, zt) =
8<: 11+r⇤ (if Bt+1   0)1  (Bt+1,zt)+ (Bt+1,zt) 
1+r⇤ (if Bt+1 < 0),
(3.5)
That is, the bond price reflects both the default risk and the risk of debt restructuring.
Using the bond price function, the interest rate on working capital loans can be written
as:
rt(Bt+1, zt) =
8<: 1qt(Bt+1,zt)   1 (if rt < rd)rd (otherwise). (3.6)
When the government saves (Bt+1 > 0) or does not default on it debt, the interest rate on
working capital loans is a function of the bond price. However, if the government decides
to default on its debt, then the interest rate is the maximum level in the economy, which is
exogenously set in the model.
3.2.5 Recursive Equilibrium
We focus on a recursive equilibrium, where there is no enforcement. Based on the foreign
creditors’ problem, government’s debt demand is met as long as the gross return on the bond
equals to the risk free rate, 1 + r.
We can characterize the government’s default policy by default and repayment sets. Let
A(B) be the set of z for which repayment is optimal when assets are B, such that
A(B) =
 
z 2 Z : vc(B, z)   vd(B, z) , (3.7)
and let D(B) = A˜(B) be the set of z for which default is optimal for a level of assets B:
D(B) =
 
z 2 Z : vc(B, z) < vd(B, z) . (3.8)
Also, let s = {B, z} be the set of aggregate states for the economy.
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Definition 2. The recursive equilibrium for this economy is defined as a set of policy func-
tions for (i) consumption c(s); (ii) government’s asset holdings B0(s), repayment sets A(B),
and default sets D(B); (iii) the wage function w(B0, z); and (iv) the price function for bonds
q(B0, z) such that:
1. Households’ consumption c(s) satisfies the resource constraints, taking the government
policies as given.
2. The government’s policy functions B0(s), repayment sets A(B), and default sets D(B)
satisfy the government optimization problem, taking the bond price function q(B0, z) as
given.
3. The optimal wage function w(B0, z) satisfies firms’ optimization problem, taking the in-
terest rate on working capital loans r(B0, z) as given.
4. Bonds prices q(B0, z) reflect the government’s default probabilities and default probabili-
ties satisfy creditors’ expected zero profits.
5. Labor market clears.
At the equilibrium, the bond price function should satisfy both the government’s opti-
mization problem and the expected zero profits in the lenders’ problem, so that probability
of default endogenously a↵ects the bond price. Using the default sets, we can express the
probability of default such that:
 (B0, z) =
Z
D(B0)
f(z0, z)dz0.
3.3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
We solve the model numerically. In this section, we describe the estimation procedure for
the shock processes. We calibrate the model to analyze the debt dynamics quantitatively,
using Argentine data between 1990-2002.
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3.3.1 Data
First, we begin with documenting the business cycle characteristics of the Argentine economy.
For the business cycle statistics we use real output, consumption and trade balance data in
quarterly, seasonally adjusted, real series covering the period 1993Q1 and 2001Q4 from the
dataset in Arellano (2008)4. We take logs of GDP and consumption series and detrend these
series using an HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. The trade balance data are
reported as a fraction of GDP. We also borrow the spread data from Arellano (2008), which
are defined as the di↵erence between the interest rate in Argentina and the yield of the
five-year US Treasury bond. The interest rate series is EMBI for Argentina and start from
1983Q3. The quarterly wage series are available in International Financial Statistics (IFS)
and Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC). We take logs and detrend the
series using an HP filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 1600. For the labor data, we
use the weekly hours of work from INDEC. However, these are only available starting from
1997. Hence, we use a short time series for labor.
Table 15 presents the business cycle statistics of all the data available up to the default
episode that started in December 26, 2001. The first column shows the standard deviations
up to the default episode. We find that consumption, wage, and labor are more volatile
than output. The second and the third column present the correlations of each variable
with the output and the interest rate spread, respectively. It has been shown that emerging
market economies are characterized by countercyclical spread rates and net exports. Also,
their consumption is highly correlated with output. We see similar empirical results for
Argentina in the second column. In addition, we see that labor and wage are procyclical
with output. The interest rate spread is negatively correlated with consumption and output,
and positively correlated with trade balance. Wages and the labor are negatively correlated
with the spread rate.
4Arellano (2008) uses the data provided by the Ministery of Finance of Argentina.
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Table 15: Business cycle statistics for Argentina from 1993Q1 to 2001Q4
std(x) corr(x, y) corr(x, rc)
Interest rates spread 3.08  0.74  
Trade balance 1.75  0.58 0.70
Consumption 3.75 0.97  0.68
Output 3.33    0.74
Wage 4.18 0.49  0.34
Labor⇤ 3.69 0.58  0.85
Other Statistics in default in 2002
Output drop 12.01
Consumption drop 12.86
Wage drop 13.88
Labor drop 18.46
Default probability 2.78
* Quarterly labor data are available only between 1997Q1 and 2001Q4
3.3.2 Calibration
The model is solved quantitatively. In the numerical solution, we define one period as a
quarter. Our calibration strategy is largely based on Argentine data. Table 16 shows the
calibrated parameter values.
The utility function represents GHH preferences. The risk aversion parameter,  , is set
to two, the risk-free interest rate is set to one percent, and the capital share to 0.32 percent,
which are standard values in macroeconomics literature. The curvature parameter of labor
in GHH preference is set to 1.455 which determines Frisch wage elasticity by 1! 1 = 2.2. The
debt recovery rate  is set to 0.27 following Benjamin and Wright (2009). Benjamin and
Wright (2009) estimate the recovery rate for all the default episodes in recorded history. For
Argentina’s default in 2001, they estimate it as 27 percent.
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For the TFP shock process, we assume that it follows an AR(1) process:
log zt = ⇢z log zt 1 + ✏t
with ✏ ⇠ N(0,  2z). We use the quadrature method in Tauchen (1986) to construct a Markov
approximation with 21 realizations. Data for labor is not available for 1993Q1 to 1996Q4,
so we set ⇢z and  z to target the standard deviation and first-order autocorrelation of quar-
terly HP filtered GDP data of Argentina. We use seasonally-adjusted quarterly real GDP
data from Arellano (2008) for the period 1980Q1 to 2005Q4. The standard deviation and
autocorrelation of the cyclical component of GDP are 3.3 percent and 0.86, respectively. To
match these targets, we set ⇢z = 0.952 and  z = 0.017.
Table 16: Calibration
Name Parameters Description
Risk-free interest rate r⇤ = 0.010 Standard RBC value
Risk aversion   = 2.000 Standard RBC value
Capital share ↵ = 0.320 Mendoza (1991)
Curvature parameter of labor supply ! = 1.455 Frisch wage elasticity=2.2
Debt recovery rate  = 0.270 Benjamin and Wright (2009)
Calibration Values Target statistics
Autocorrelation of TFP shocks ⇢z = 0.952 GDP autocorrelation = 0.860
Standard deviation of TFP shocks  z = 0.017 GDP std. deviation = 0.033
Discount factor   = 0.877 Default probability = 2.78%
Interest rate on working capital in default rd = 0.350 Wage drop in default = 13.88%
Probability of reentry   = 0.150 Trade Balance Volatility = 1.75
Fraction of working capital ✓ = 0.145 Output drop in default = 12.01%
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Table 16 shows our calibration strategy. The discount parameter  , the working capital
interest rate in default rd, the probability of reentry into international debt market,  , and
the fraction of working capital, ✓, target default probability, wage drop in default, output
drop in default, and trade balance volatility. We use SMM method to match these targets
and the parameters are calibrated, such that   = 0.877, rd = 0.35,   = 0.150, and ✓ = 0.145.
3.4 SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we begin with the analysis of the benchmark model’s results and we also
elaborate on the intuition on the workings of the model. To solve the model numerically,
we use the discrete state-space method. We discretize the asset space, making sure that the
minimum and the maximum points on the grid do not bind when we compute the optimal
debt decision.
Figure 4 shows the default risk and the bond price schedule generated by the model. As
the model suggests the more the government borrows, the higher the default risk becomes.
In addition, default risk increases as the economy is hit by low TFP shocks. Similar to
the results presented in standard default literature, such as Arellano (2008) and Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006), we observe that the bond price is an increasing function of the assets, such
that high levels of debt entails a low bond price. The bond price schedule is determined
by not only the default risk, but also the risk of debt restructuring and the expected bond
price in default qd, which is constant regardless of the TFP shock’s size. Even though the
government is not able to borrow in default, its debt arrears are evaluated at the bond price
in default, qd. In addition, the bond price is an increasing function in TFP shock. That is,
the economy with high TFP shock pays less interest on its debt than the one subject to low
TFP shock.
The first panel in Figure 5 shows the interest rates on working capital loans generated
by the model. The interest rate is calculated using (3.6). Unlike the standard sovereign
default models, the interest rate on working capital has an upper bound of rd and it is the
level that the firms need to pay for borrowing working capital, when the sovereign declares
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Figure 4: Default risk and bond prices
default. The interest rate on working capital is a decreasing function in government assets
and TFP shocks. Firms in the economy with high TFP shock and low debt pay less interest
on working capital compared to those in the economy with low TFP shock and high debt. On
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Figure 5: Interest rate on working capital and labor supply
the second panel in Figure 5, we show that the labor supply increases as the government assets
increase and the state of the world gets better. Intuitively, wages increase in expansions, so
households are willing to supply more labor. Also, firms face lower interest rates on working
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Figure 6: Saving and value functions
capital loans, which reduces labor costs, therefore in equilibrium they demand more labor
during expansions.
The first panel in Figure 6 shows the saving policy function conditional on not defaulting,
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which is similar with the standard default model. Our results show that the government
borrows more in expansions and is less likely to default in good states of the world. This
result is consistent with countercyclical interest rates, since it becomes more costly to borrow
in bad states of the world. The second panel of Figure 6 is the value of option as a function
of assets. The small kink shows the level of assets above which repayment is optimal.
Next, we move on to the business cycle statistics generated by the benchmark model and
we evaluate the performance of the model with Argentine data. The simulation results for
the benchmark model are presented in Table 17. The benchmark model generates a default
probability of 0.03 percent, which is relatively smaller than the data (3 percent). In our
model, we don’t have ad-hoc default penalty as other literatures on sovereign default. Even
without this type of output penalty, the simulation results from our model are fairly similar
to the business cycle statistics in Argentina. The model also generates large drops in output
and wage during default episodes as in the data. The model can also generate high volatility
in labor supply.
In terms of correlations with output, consumption shows a positive correlation and the
interest rate spread shows a negative correlation consistent with the data. Moreover, there
is a negative correlation between output and trade balance. The reason is that households
can consume more than their income from wages and profits during expansions, because the
government can borrow easily. On the other hand, when there is a recession, borrowing is
constrained, therefore the consumption is less than the income from wages and profits of the
firms. This generates a countercyclical trade balance over the business cycle. Correlations
with interest rate show consistent results with the data.
Our model also performs well in terms of generating a procyclical labor supply. We
obtain a procyclical labor supply because two things change when the economy is hit by an
adverse TFP shock; first, the shock has a direct e↵ect on production and it reduces output
because productivity is lower and firms demand less labor, which is a standard result of an
RBC model. Second, the shock has an indirect e↵ect on production through the increase
in endogenous default risk. Because the government is more likely to default, the interest
rate on the working capital loan is also higher, which makes production even more costly
for the firms and it dampens firms’ labor demand even more. Equilibrium wages also drop
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Table 17: Statistical moments in the benchmark model and in the data
Statistics Data Model Model (✓ = 0)
 (labor) (%) 3.69 5.96 7.36
 (c) /  (y) 1.13 1.01 0.97
 (labor) /  (y) 0.86 0.69 0.68
corr(y,spread) -0.74 -0.25 -
corr(y,tb) -0.58 -0.22 0.99
corr(y,labor) 0.58 1.00 1.00
corr(spread,tb) 0.70 0.02 -
corr(spread,labor) -0.85 -0.25 -
Other statistics in default
Output drop (%) 12.01 20.12 -
Consumption drop (%) 12.86 23.03 -
Wage drop (%) 13.88 7.79 -
Target
Output drop (%) 12.01 20.12
Labor drop (%) 18.46 17.12
Default probability (%) 2.78 0.02
Average debt/GDP ratio (%) 33.20 30.60
because they are inversely related to interest rates and positively related to the TFP shock.
Because of the GHH preferences, the substitution e↵ect dominates the income e↵ect and
the households are wiling to supply less labor. Overall this generates even larger drops in
output. When households’ income drops so much due to the decreases in labor income, the
government would like to borrow even more from foreign lenders so that households can have
smooth consumption. However, since the shocks are persistent, the foreign lenders adjust
their expectations about the future state of the economy, such that they ask for an even
higher premium on the government bonds. This generates a vicious cycle, in which output,
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labor, consumption and wages decrease further and it becomes harder for the government to
roll over its debt. Thus, the government may choose to default to eliminate the tax burden
necessary to finance the existing debt, especially when the level of existing debt is already
very high.
To look at the role of the working capital condition, we set ✓ equal to zero. We find that
this model generates no default. In addition, consumption becomes less volatile than output
and the trade balance becomes procyclical. The results show that the financing of working
capital plays an important role in generating default risk.
3.5 CONCLUSION
This paper studies the relationship between endogenous default risk and labor decisions us-
ing a stochastic general equilibrium model in a small open economy. With the assumptions
on working capital loans and the debt renegotiation in default, our model performs well in
matching the business cycle characteristics of the Argentine economy. We obtain counter-
cyclical interest rates and procyclical labor. An increase in default risk yields a lower bond
price and it implies a high interest rate on working capital loans. As the cost of production
increases, firm’s labor demand decreases. Since equilibrium wages also drop and the substi-
tution e↵ect dominates the income e↵ect, the households are willing to supply less labor. In
equilibrium we find that both production and labor are lower, when the economy is hit by
an adverse TFP shock. The reduction in labor income and output induces the government
to want to borrow more from foreign lenders; however, the lenders ask for higher premiums
due to the endogenous default risk. This makes borrowing even harder for the government
and the government may choose to default to eliminate the tax burden necessary to finance
the existing debt.
This paper investigates the feedback loop between the financing of firms working capital
and sovereign default risk. Firms’ demand for labor and the cost of private credit play an
important role in generating endogenous drops in output and employment that are observed
during default episodes. The model also explains how the aggregate variables move over the
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business cycle. Thus, the paper connects the default risk to the real business cycles in small
open economies.
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4.0 R&D INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS DURING
THE GREAT RECESSION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In 2010, R&D expenditures totaled 363, 434 million dollars (constant 2005 prices) or 2.8
percent of the national GDP.1 Even though this seems small compared to other forms of
investment, the literature has shown that R&D plays an important role in increasing e -
ciency and creating technical change, thus contributing to the overall growth of the economy.
Financing of R&D activities is particularly interesting since R&D cannot be easily collater-
alized. Many papers in the literature point out that there is a wedge between external and
internal sources of finance for R&D investments, making financial constraints more promi-
nent.2 The empirical approach to test for the presence of financial constraints on R&D
investment builds on the vast literature that explores the sensitivity of investment to finan-
cial variables. However, this approach has been criticized because the causal connection
between investment and financial variables is hard to document due to endogeneity issues.3
Not only is it di cult to find a good instrument for the financial variables, but including
control variables for investment demand and firm productivity also comes with the caveat
that measurement errors can lead to biased estimates.4 More recent papers estimate dy-
namic R&D regressions over a period of time using a systems GMM approach. They include
1Source: National Science Foundation (NSF) Report, 2011.
2See Hall and Lerner (2010) for a detailed discussion of financing of R&D and a review of the literature
related to financial constraints on R&D investment.
3Using investment-cash flow sensitivity to test for the presence of financial constraints started with Fazzari
et al. (1988). See Kaplan and Zingales (1997) for possible endogeneity issues in this approach.
4See Erickson and Whited (2000) on measurement error problems in Tobin’s Q.
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variables to control for investment demand as a remedy for endogeneity issues.5
As an alternative way to identify financial constraints, this paper takes advantage of a
natural experiment by focusing on the Great Recession period. The recession started with
the emergence of the subprime loan crisis, which created turmoil in the housing market and
had subsequent real e↵ects on the economy. This aspect of the recession makes it a good
setting in which to analyze firms’ investment behavior after being hit by an exogenous shock.
The key question in this paper is whether the R&D investment of U.S. manufacturing firms
was liquidity-constrained during the Great Recession. I focus on the investment behavior of
publicly traded, non-federally funded, high-technology manufacturing firms in the U.S. over
the period 2007Q4-2008Q4 using data obtained from the Compustat database. In order to
test for the existence of financial constraints, I construct R&D stocks using the perpetual
inventory method. I estimate the e↵ect of liquidity at the beginning of the recession on
the growth rate of R&D stocks over the recession, controlling for firm profitability, size and
age, as well as for industry characteristics. The key predictions of this estimation are that
the coe cient on liquidity is positive and that the coe cient on liquidity interacted with
the bond dummy is negative for financially-constrained firms. In this sense, the paper uses
a methodology similar to that of Stein et al. (1994), which focus on inventory investments
during the 1981-82 recession to identify bank-dependent firms. In this paper, I also perform
a cross-sectional empirical test to show that financial constraints become more binding in a
recession, and I analyze their e↵ect on R&D investments.
The main finding of this paper is that firms that do not borrow from public bond markets
experienced binding liquidity constraints on their R&D investments during the recession.
Liquidity has a significant positive e↵ect for firms without bond ratings, even after controlling
for firm size, age and profitability. The estimates suggest that if the liquidity were increased
by one standard deviation, the R&D stocks would increase by around 7.3 percentage points,
which is about one third of the actual increase observed during the recession period. The
evidence for liquidity constraints is also documented for various subsamples that are likely
to face financial constraints, such as small firms, young firms and firms that do not pay
5Highly cited papers are Brown et al. (2009) and Brown and Petersen (2009), Brown and Petersen (2014)
for R&D investment in the U.S. and Brown et al. (2012) in Europe.
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dividends. Sensitivity of R&D investment to liquidity is, again, strongest for those firms
without bond ratings in these subsamples. I also test for the presence of liquidity constraints
on capital and inventory investments of firms that also do R&D.6 I find that firms without
bond ratings experienced tighter constraints in all three types of investments compared to
firms with bond ratings. Firms without bond ratings show the highest liquidity sensitivity
for inventory investments, and investment-liquidity sensitivity is greater for capital than it
is for R&D investments. This result also supports the fact that these firms adjust their
inventories more rapidly, compared to capital and R&D investments, when they are hit by
a bad shock. On the other hand, the investment behavior of firms with bond ratings shows
less sensitivity to liquidity for all three types of investments. Overall, the results confirm
the business cycle properties of these series– i.e., inventory investment is the most volatile
and R&D investment is the least volatile type of investment. The evidence for financial
constraints is also robust to various procedures used to construct R&D stocks and capital
stocks, which assume di↵erent depreciation rates. Financial constraints seem to be a concern
mainly for non-federally funded high-technology firms since I do not obtain similar results
for funded high-technology firms or for low-technology firms in the manufacturing sector.
This paper is related mainly to the R&D investment and financial constraints literatures.
Papers in the financial constraints literature use some proxies to group firms based on their
dependence on cash flow, and they check for investment-cash flow sensitivity separately
for these groups of firms to test for the presence of financial constraints.7 Fazzari et al.
(1988), Hoshi et al. (1991), Lamont (1997), and Hubbard (1998) focus on constraints in
capital investments. As mentioned, Stein et al. (1994) check for the constraints in inventory
investments of bank-dependent firms. In this paper, I use similar proxies (i.e., firm age, firm
size, dividend payment and existence of a bond rating) to identify potentially constrained
firms in my sample. Brown et al. (2009) and Brown and Petersen (2009) try to explore the
role of internal finance in aggregate R&D investments in the U.S. Similar to the findings
of this paper, they show that particularly small and young firms show higher investment-
6For this analysis, I construct capital stock series for each firm, using the perpetual inventory method
and capital expenditures data. Inventory stock data are available on the Compustat database.
7Erickson and Whited (2000), Almeida and Campello (2007), and Hennessy and Whited (2007) emphasize
the importance of finding exogenous proxies in these estimations.
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cashflow sensitivity for R&D investments.
This paper also contributes to the recent literature that explores the relationship between
investment and cash flow and finds that investment-cash flow sensitivity has been declining
over time. Brown et al. (2009) studying the period 1970-2006, show that investment-cash
flow sensitivity has declined considerably for capital investments, but that it still remains
significant for R&D investments. They state that the decline in sensitivity is due to the
development in equity markets that firms rely on stock issues more than on debt in financing
investments. Chen and Chen (2012) use time series variance as an identification strategy
and show that R&D investment sensitivity disappeared during the last recession. Therefore,
they conclude that investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial
constraints. These findings suggest that it is important to use other measures to identify
constraints that are not subject to demand-side e↵ects. In this paper, using a well known
measure– i.e., liquidity-investment sensitivity and using a natural experiment as an iden-
tification strategy, I find evidence for the constraints. The natural experiment approach
used in this paper eliminates the endogeneity problem between investment and the financing
decision. As a result, this paper shows that the identification strategy is very important in
showing clear evidence of financial constraints.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the data and
summary statistics about the R&D investment behavior of firms during the Great Recession
and describes the regression sample. The empirical specification is explained in Section 4.3.
Section 4.4 lays out the main results for firms’ R&D investments. Section 4.5 presents the
sample when capital and inventory investments are also considered, describes the specifi-
cation and discusses the results. Section 4.6 provides a robustness analysis. Section 4.7
concludes.
4.2 DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
In the U.S., most R&D investment is done by firms in high-technology industries. Using
micro-level data from the Compustat database, one can compare the level of investment in
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publicly traded manufacturing firms in high-tech and low-tech industries.8 High-tech indus-
tries with two-digit SIC codes (reported in parentheses) are chemicals and allied products
(28); industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment (35); electronic and
other electrical equipment and components, except computer (36); transportation equip-
ment (37); and measuring, analyzing and controlling instruments (38). Figure 7 shows the
total R&D expenditures of firms in the manufacturing sector between 1991Q1-2011Q4, in-
cluding and excluding high-tech industry firms. The figure illustrates that, in the sample,
low-tech industry firms do very little R&D compared to high-tech industry.9 A large drop
in the R&D investment of high-tech firms during the Great Recession is also evident.
Figure 7: The total R&D expenditures in manufacturing between 1991-2011
The figure plots the total R&D expenditures of firms in the manufacturing sector
between 1991-2011 using the Compustat database. The data belong to firms that have
their headquarters in the U.S. and have two-digit SIC numbers between 20-39. Firms
that do not report a stock price and employment data and that have nonpositive R&D
expenditures are eliminated. The data are deflated using the GDP deflator. Firms
that have the following two-digit SIC codes are classified as high-tech: 28, 35, 36, 37
and 38. The gray bars indicate the recession periods.
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A similar comparison can be made between federally funded and non-federally funded
8The steps that I followed to construct the datasets for Figures 7 and 9 are explained in detail in the
Appendix B.1. The grey bars indicate recession periods.
9These results are in line with Brown et al. (2009), which includes all firms, not only manufacturing.
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firms in the U.S. Figure 8, which is based on a National Science Foundation (NSF) report,
shows the total annual expenditures on R&D. Non-federally funded R&D expenditures have
been at least twice as high as federally funded R&D expenditures in the last decade. The
level of non-federally funded R&D expenditures decreased between 2007 and 2009, while
federally funded R&D expenditures showed an increasing trend during that period. These
results suggest that mostly non-federally funded firms’ R&D expenditures were potentially
constrained during the recession.
Figure 8: The total R&D expenditures in manufacturing between 1991-2011 (grouped by
funding)
The figure plots the total R&D expenditures of non-federally funded and federally
funded firms in the manufacturing sector between 1991-2011 using data from National
Science Foundation reports.
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Next, I analyze the average R&D expenditure-to-assets and the average liquidity (i.e.,
cash and short-term investments as a fraction of total assets) in the sample of non-funded,
high-tech firms between 1990Q4 and 2011Q4. The non-funded, high-tech industries with
three-digit SIC codes (reported in parentheses) are drugs (283); computer and o ce equip-
ment (357); communications equipment (366); electronic components and accessories (367);
measuring and controlling devices (382); and food and related products (384).10 The ex-
10The list of non-federally funded, high-tech industries was obtained from Brown et al. (2009).
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istence of a bond rating has often been used as a proxy for potential financial strength.11
Thus, it is crucial to discuss the di↵erences in R&D investment and cash-holding behavior
among firms with and without bond ratings.
Figure 9 shows these di↵erences, and three points are worth mentioning. First, the
firms with bond ratings experienced a significantly lower reduction in liquidity during the
recession. For these firms, the average liquidity fell from 46 percent to 33 percent and then
increased to 38 percent by the end of the recession. On the other hand, at the onset of
the recession, the average liquidity was 74 percent for the firms without access to bond
markets. By the end of the four quarters, it had fallen to 42 percent and then recovered to
48 percent by the end of the recession. This observation can be due to the precautionary
motive of firms without access to bond markets. From the outset of the recession, they
exploited liquidity for their investments, since external sources of finance became too costly
for them. Second, the graphs show that it is mainly firms without bond ratings that invest
in R&D expenditures. For these firms, the average R&D expenditure is much higher. In
the last decade, in particular, it has fluctuated between 15 percent and 40 percent, whereas
for firms with bond ratings, it has remained quite flat, at around 20 percent. One potential
reason for this result is that almost all of the large and/or mature firms in the sample have
bond ratings, and in the U.S., small and/or young firms’ share of total R&D is substantial.12
Thus, it is possible that large and/or mature firms with bond ratings may have lowered the
average R&D expenditure. Third, the average R&D expenditure for the firms without bond
ratings is much more volatile than that for firms with bond ratings. The volatility of the
R&D expenditure can be interpreted as evidence of liquidity constraints since, due to the
high adjustment costs, firms prefer to smooth their R&D investments.
Table 18 shows the main summary statistics for the regression sample.13 The majority
of the firms have a bond rating from Standard & Poor’s. Firms are also classified based on
their age, size, and dividend payments. Firm age is computed based on the year in which
the first observation of closing-price data is found in the Compustat database. If the firm
11Early papers that use the existence of bond ratings to identify potentially constrained firms are Fazzari
et al. (1988) and Whited (1992) for capital investments and Stein et al. (1994) for inventory investments.
12This fact is well documented by Brown et al. (2009). See Table 30 for the composition of firms in the
sample.
13The steps that I take in constructing the regression sample are explained in detail in the Appendix B.2.
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Figure 9: Investment behavior of firms with/without bond ratings
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The figures plot the mean R&D-to-assets ratio and liquidity of non-funded high-
technology firms with/without a bond rating from Standard & Poor’s using data from
Compustat database. The data cover the period 1991-2011. The data belong to firms
that have their headquarters in the U.S. and have the following three-digit SIC num-
bers: 283, 357, 366, 367, 382 and 384. Firms that do not report a stock price and
employment data and that have nonpositive R&D expenditures are eliminated. The
data are deflated using the GDP deflator. Liquidity is defined as cash and short-term
investments as a fraction of total assets. The R&D-to-assets ratio is defined as the
ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets. All variables are Winsorized at one percent.
The gray bars indicate the recession periods.
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has data for less than 15 years after the first observation of price data, it is listed as young;
otherwise, it is labeled as mature. Overall, there are 334 young firms, 251 with bond ratings.
Firm size is computed based on the number of employees. A firm in the upper quartile of the
sample for number of employees is listed as large; otherwise, the firm is labeled as small. In
the regression sample, there are 430 small firms, 345 with bond ratings. Firms with positive
cash dividends (DV, data item #127) are labeled as D=1 firms. In the sample, there are
473 firms with zero or negative cash dividends (D=0 firms), 389 with bond ratings.
In the whole sample, the median firm has a liquidity of 38 percent. Firms without
bond ratings keep around twice as much liquidity as firms with bond ratings. The median
young firm, small firm, or no-dividend-payment firm also keeps more liquidity than the
median of the whole sample. In these subcategories, the median firm without a bond rating
keeps significantly more liquidity than the median firm with a bond rating. The summary
statistics support the possibility that firms without bond ratings, small firms, young firms,
and firms with no dividend payments are financially weaker and, therefore, keep higher levels
of liquidity as a means of precautionary saving.
Based on asset size, firms with bond ratings are also larger than the average. Young,
small, or no-dividend-payment firms have smaller assets. Another noteworthy observation is
that young firms, small firms, and no-dividend-payment firms have markedly higher increases
in their R&D stocks. Also, firms without bond ratings experience higher growth of R&D
stocks. Again, these points are consistent with the observation that small and young firms
do most of the R&D investment, as reported in the literature. The figures also support these
facts. Thus, if there were financial constraints that could have been eliminated, one would
have expected an even larger increase in their R&D stocks.
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4.3 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
In order to test for the existence of financial constraints, I look at investment-liquidity
sensitivity. I estimate:14
 log(RD) = ↵0+↵1LIQ 1+↵2LIQ 1 ⇤B 1+↵3Q 1+Size+Age+ Ind+Error. (4.1)
The dependent variable represents the growth rate of the R&D stocks over the period between
2007Q4 and 2008Q4. The independent variables are the liquidity (LIQ) measured in the
2007Q4 and liquidity interacted with the bond dummy (LIQ ⇤ B). The bond dummy (B)
is equal to one, if the firm has access to bond markets. As mentioned above, Q is the
market-to-book ratio and is included to control for the profitability of the investment. This
specification also controls for the e↵ects of industry-specific factors that may play a role in
investment decisions with the two-digit industry dummies (Ind). Furthermore, I include
firm size and age dummies, which take binary values. It has been shown that especially
young or small firms face larger financial constraints, so these dummies control for the firm
characteristics. Size dummy is equal to 1 if the firm is large, and Age dummy is equal to
1 if the firm is mature. In order to eliminate further endogeneity issues, all terms involving
LIQ 1 are instrumented by the lagged liquidity term (i.e., liquidity at the end of 2006Q4),
and the specification is estimated using instrumental variables and generalized method of
moments (IV-GMM) estimation. To verify that liquidity is important for R&D investments
and to show that liquidity constraints are present, I expect to get a positive coe cient for ↵1
and a negative coe cient for ↵2. This implies that LIQ matters less in the R&D investments
of firms that can borrow from the bonds markets. Also, I anticipate a positive estimate for
↵3.
As mentioned in the introduction, the main endogeneity problem arises from the fact
that liquidity may be a proxy for the profitability of investment, instead of for the presence
of financial constraints. It might be the case that firms that make higher profits are also
the ones that keep high levels of liquidity and choose to invest more. The panacea for the
14This specification is similar to the one used by Stein et al. (1994), in which they test for bank-dependence
in inventory investments of the firms.
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endogeneity problem is to focus on the Great Recession period, which forms a natural case
study with a negative exogenous shock to the economy increasing the financial constraints
on firms. As a result, I expect that investment-liquidity sensitivity will be more significant
for firms that face tighter liquidity constraints. In this paper, the main comparison is among
firms with and without access to bond markets, and I anticipate that the latter are more
liquidity-constrained.
In addition, I control for the future profitability of investment by including the initial
market-to-book ratio (Q) that the firms had at the start of the recession.15 One caveat
pertaining to this control is measurement problems. It has been debated in the literature
that market-to-book ratio may be mismeasured, particularly for small firms or young firms,
which are more likely to be constrained. Especially for newly established small firms, there
might be less information on their performance. If this is the case, Q will also have less
information about investment profitability than it does for the unconstrained firms. This
measurement problem may result in an estimation of liquidity that is biased upwards because
the explanatory power will be shifted away from Q to the liquidity variable. To check this,
I run the regressions with and without Q. Such a problem does not seem to be present,
especially in small or young firms. Other commonly used control variables in the literature are
the amount of dividends and debt holdings of the firm. Again, the main problem with these
control variables is the presence of possible endogeneity issues, as they may be simultaneously
determined with investment decisions. Thus, I do not include them. On the other hand, the
existence of a bond rating is exogenous since the bond rating is based on the judgement of
an agency that depends on the firms’ past performance for an adequate length of time.16
The sample-splitting technique according to firm size, age, dividend payments or the
existence of a bond rating has often been used in the literature in order to ascertain firms
with a high cost of external resources. Unfortunately, with this specification, it is not possible
to make a direct comparison between young vs. mature, small vs. large or D=0 vs. D=1
15Another control variable that is commonly used in the literature for future profitability of investment is
the initial sales-to-assets ratio. In regressions, the sales-to-assets ratio never appears with a significant sign,
so it is not reported in the results.
16See Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Erickson and Whited (2000) for detailed discussions of the
control variables and of Tobin’s Q. Alti (2003) shows that Tobin’s Q can be a noisy measure for investment
opportunities for young firms.
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firms because almost all mature, large, or D=1 firms in the sample have access to bond
markets. Therefore, I split the sample and run the regressions on young, small or D=0 firms
only to see if any of the full sample results also hold for these firms. The sample-splitting
test among firms with and without access to bond markets is possible, though. I expect the
coe cient on LIQ to be large and significant for firms without access to bond markets and
small and not significant for firms with access to bond markets. This test is less powerful
since it allows for the intercept to di↵er across B=0 and B=1 firms.
4.4 RESULTS
Table 19 shows the results of the estimation of equation 4.1 for all firms, controlling for
di↵erent firm and industry characteristics. The coe cient for LIQ is positive and highly
significant in the specifications, where it is included by itself. When the interaction term
between liquidity and the bond dummy is included, its coe cient is negative and strongly
significant. These results imply that liquidity plays an important role in R&D investments
for all firms. However, for firms with bond ratings, its overall significance is smaller.
This result is also robust to inclusion of control variables, such as initial market-to-book
value (Q) and sales. Market-to-book value has coe cients near zero but is highly significant.
In all of the estimates, initial sales are estimated insignificantly, so they are not reported in
the results. The estimate for size dummy suggests that the average di↵erence in the growth
rate of R&D stocks between large and small firms is small and positive. The di↵erence
between young and mature firms is small and negative.
Table 20 shows the results from the sample splits. In all firms in the sample, the coe cient
of liquidity is 0.25 for the firms without access to bond markets and 0.07 for the firms with
access to bond markets. The estimates of LIQ are statistically di↵erent at ten percent.
Similar results are obtained for the subsamples. In the young firms sample, LIQ is significant
and positive (0.27) for B=0 firms and insignificant and close to zero (0.01) for B=1 firms. The
di↵erence between the coe cients on LIQ of B=0 and B=1 firms is statistically significant at
the one percent level. Also, in small firms and D=0 firms samples, firms with bond ratings
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Table 19: IV-GMM estimation: financial constraints in R&D investment
Whole Sample
LIQ 0.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤⇤ 0.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.17⇤⇤⇤ 0.12⇤⇤⇤ 0.20⇤⇤⇤
(3.36) (4.39) (3.30) (4.42) (3.62) (4.61)
LIQ ⇤B    0.13⇤⇤⇤    0.13⇤⇤⇤    0.12⇤⇤⇤
( 343) ( 3.48) ( 3.30)
Q     0.00⇤⇤ 0.00⇤⇤ 0.00⇤⇤ 0.00⇤⇤⇤
(2.28) (2.46) (2.40) (3.03)
Size         0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤
    (3.10) (3.00)
Age          0.03⇤⇤  0.02
    (2.22) ( 1.36)
R2 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.09
N 577 577 577 577 577 577
Estimation is by IV-GMM robust standard errors. Industry dummies are included.
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. (***,**,* represent significance level at 1%,
5% and 10%, respectively.)
show more sensitivity to liquidity than firms without bond ratings.
Overall, these results confirm that liquidity matters for R&D investment, especially for
firms without access to bond markets. The fact that these results hold for young, small or
D = 0 firms is also consistent with findings from the financial constraints literature.
Are these results economically meaningful? It is not possible to draw any conclusions on
the size of the financial constraints or to make a structural interpretation since this is only
a reduced-form estimation. However, following a back-of-the-envelope calculation exercise
similar to that in Stein et al. (1994), it is possible to get a suggestive role of liquidity in R&D
investment. In the sample, the median firm without a bond rating had around 71 percent
liquidity, with a standard deviation of 29 percent at the beginning of the recession. The
median firm without a bond rating increased its R&D stock by 22 percent. The coe cient
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Table 20: IV-GMM estimation: financial constraints in R&D investment -
sample splits
All Firms Young Small D=0
B = 0 B = 1 B = 0 B = 1 B = 0 B = 1 B = 0 B = 1
LIQ 0.25⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤⇤ 0.27⇤⇤⇤ 0.01 0.25⇤⇤ 0.08⇤⇤⇤ 0.26⇤⇤ 0.05
(2.02) (2.15) (2.08) (0.29) (2.08) (2.62) (2.12) (1.39)
Q 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.00⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.00 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.00⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.00⇤⇤⇤
(3.13) (3.23) (3.15) (1.09) (3.30) (3.46) (3.31) (2.72)
R2 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.04 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.04
N 88 489 83 251 85 345 85 393
Estimation is by IV-GMM robust standard errors. Industry dummies are included. Z-
statistics are reported in parentheses. (***,**,* represent significance level at 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.)
of LIQ is estimated as 0.25 for this type of firm. As a result, if the liquidity were increased
by one standard deviation, the R&D stock would increase by roughly another 7.3 percentage
points. This is about one third of the actual increase in R&D stocks, which could be
considered a substantial amount.
4.5 LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS ON CAPITAL AND INVENTORY
INVESTMENTS
In this section, I will extend the above methods to test for the presence of financial constraints
on capital and inventory investments in order to compare them with R&D investments.
Such a comparison is interesting, since the financing of R&D is di↵erent from other types
of investments due to the lack of collateral value.17 Thus, one might expect that R&D
17See Hall and Lerner (2010) for a discussion of why there is often a large wedge between internal and
external sources of finance for R&D investments compared to other types of investments.
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investments faced higher constraints during the last recession. However, the time series
characteristics of these investments are di↵erent in terms of their volatilities, inventories
being the most and R&D being the least volatile. This is due to the fact that inventories
respond to shocks more quickly than other types of investments do. Consequently, focusing
on a four-quarter-long period, one may observe higher investment-liquidity sensitivity for
inventories than for R&D investment.
The construction of the regression sample and the estimation of capital stocks are ex-
plained in detail in the Appendix B.2. This analysis requires firms to report all three types
of investments. Additionally, I choose firms that have their fiscal years end in the fourth
quarter. This step restricts the sample to firms that experienced similar macroeconomic
conditions, especially since the start of the recession coincided with the beginning of a new
fiscal year.18
The empirical specification uses the same right-hand-side variables as equation 4.1, but
with di↵erent dependent variables, which makes the comparison between di↵erent invest-
ment types feasible. In order to test for the presence of financial constraints on the capital
investment, the left-hand-side variable for capital investment is the log di↵erence of capital
stocks between 2007Q4 and 2008Q4. For inventory investment, the dependent variable is
the log di↵erence of inventories between 2007Q4 and 2008Q4.
Table 21 reports the summary statistics. Between the R&D-only sample and this sample,
three observations are di↵erent. First, the number of firms is reduced by almost fifty percent.
Second, these firms keep lower liquidity and hold larger assets. Third, the percentage change
in R&D stocks is also larger for all types of firms. Similar to the previous sample, firms with
bond ratings keep larger assets. The median young, small, no-dividend-payment firm, or
the firm without a bond rating increases its R&D stocks more than the average firm. These
firms also increase their capital and inventory stocks more than the median firm in the full
sample.
Table 22 reports the results of R&D, capital and inventory investments, respectively. In
these estimations, I again control for the age and size of the firms, as well as Q and industry
18Stein et al. (1994) apply this step before they test for the liquidity constraints on the inventory investment
of the firms. The results are quite robust to the exclusion of this step.
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Table 22: IV-GMM estimation: financial constraints in R&D, capital and
inventory investments
Whole Sample R&D Capital Inventory
LIQ 0.12⇤⇤⇤ 0.21⇤⇤⇤ 0.07 0.19 0.01 0.21
(1.89) (3.23) (0.85) (1.26) (0.08) (1.20)
LIQ ⇤B    0.12⇤⇤    0.16    0.26⇤
( 2.13) ( 1.32) ( 1.74)
Q 0.01 0.01 0.01⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤
(1.08) (1.09) (1.93) (1.99) (2.53) (2.56)
Size 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08
(1.27) (1.28) (0.89) (0.89) (1.49) (1.49)
Age  0.01  0.00  0.06⇤⇤⇤  0.05⇤⇤⇤  0.10  0.09
( 0.57) ( 0.21) ( 3.27) ( 2.63) ( 1.52) ( 1.29)
R2 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.07 0.07
N 287 287 287 287 287 287
Estimation is by IV-GMM robust standard errors. Industry dummies are included.
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. (***,**,* represent significance level at 1%,
5% and 10%, respectively.)
dummies. Since the sample size is small (particularly for B=0 firms), some of the estimates
lose significance. For all forms of investments, the role of liquidity is smaller for B=1 firms.
As before, liquidity plays an important role in R&D investments, but for firms with bond
ratings, its overall significance is smaller. As can be seen, of the three forms of investments,
the coe cient on LIQ ⇤ B term is the smallest for inventories and the largest for R&D,
respectively. This suggests that the inventory investment of B=0 firms seems to benefit
more from higher liquidity, relative to B=1 firms.
The regression results on sample splits based on access to bond markets, presented in
Table 23, support the results in Table 22. Had the constrained firms received higher liquidity
in the recession, the inventory investment would have responded to this increase the most,
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Table 23: IV-GMM estimation: financial constraints in
R&D, capital and inventory investments - sample splits
R&D Capital Inventory
B = 0 B = 1 B = 0 B = 1 B = 0 B = 1
LIQ 0.03 0.08 0.33 0.03 1.01⇤⇤  0.16
(0.17) (1.60) (0.82) (0.62) (1.99) ( 1.10)
Q 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.00 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.01 0.03⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤
(2.91) (0.67) (3.63) (1.60) (2.12) (2.38)
R2 0.40 0.04 0.14 0.08 0.28 0.04
N 33 254 33 254 33 254
Estimation is by IV-GMM robust standard errors. Industry
dummies are included. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
(***,**,* represent significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respec-
tively.)
and R&D investment would have responded the least. This result suggests that inventory
investment experienced the tightest constraints for B=0 firms during the recession. It also
supports the fact that firms adjust their inventories more quickly, compared to capital and
R&D investments, when they are hit by a bad shock. On the other hand, for B=1 firms, I
obtain the opposite results. R&D investment shows some sensitivity to liquidity, but there
is no significant evidence for liquidity constraints on capital and inventory investments.
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4.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
4.6.1 R&D Investment-Liquidity Sensitivity in All Manufacturing Firms
In the above analysis, the focus is on non-funded high-tech manufacturing firms. To test
whether R&D investment-liquidity sensitivity is also evident for other manufacturing firms, I
include all of the firms with a two-digit SIC between 20-39, excluding the non-federally funded
high-tech firms. Therefore, this sample not only has federally funded high-technology firms,
but also has low-technology firms. Table 24 shows the results. It appears that these firms did
not experience liquidity constraints on R&D investments. Next, I choose federally funded
high-technology firms only. The results pertaining to this sample again show no evidence
of financial constraints. As a result, during the last recession, R&D investment-liquidity
sensitivity existed for the non-federally funded, high-technology manufacturing firms only.
4.6.2 Relaxing the Growth Rate and Depreciation Rate Assumptions used in
R&D Stocks
In this section, the R&D stocks are constructed using a constant growth rate, eight percent,
as Hall (1990) suggests. Table 25 reports the results of the estimations. The regression
results do not seem to be very sensitive to the choice of growth rate. In all panels, LIQ
is estimated significantly, and the size of the coe cients are similar to the ones reported in
Table 19.
Next, I change the depreciation rate, which is initially set to 15 percent, and test the
e↵ect of a lower and a higher depreciation rate, ten percent and 20 percent, respectively.
Table 26 shows the results for the whole sample of firms and shows that the results are
robust to the choice of depreciation rate.
82
Table 24: IV-GMM estimation: financial constraints in R&D
investment for various samples of firms
Manufacturing Firms
Whole Sample Exc. nonfunded hightech Funded hightech
LIQ  0.09 0.09  0.11⇤ 0.02
( 1.40) (0.41) ( 1.79) ( 0.10)
LIQ ⇤B    0.21    0.12
( 1.02) ( 0.68)
Q 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.74) (0.86) (0.68) (0.77)
Size  0.01  0.01  0.03⇤  0.03⇤
( 0.69) ( 0.68) ( 1.71) ( 1.72)
Age  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.01
( 1.48) ( 0.68) ( 0.81) ( 0.73)
R2 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.08
N 202 202 152 152
Estimation is by IV-GMM robust standard errors. Industry dummies are
included. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. (***,**,* represent
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.)
4.6.3 Capital Stocks Assuming Double-Declining Balance
Another common way of constructing capital stocks is to assume a double-declining balance,
which implies that the depreciation rate is equal to 2Lj instead of
1
Lj
.19 The results are
reported in Table 27. Assuming a double-declining balance does not a↵ect the results for
the liquidity sensitivity of capital investment.
19Eberly et al. (2008) is an example of research that uses double-declining balance.
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Table 25: IV-GMM estimation: financial con-
straints in R&D investment (fixed g)
Whole Sample B = 0 B = 1
LIQ 0.12⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤⇤ 0.25⇤⇤ 0.08⇤⇤
(3.66) (3.87) (2.09) (2.50)
LIQ ⇤B    0.08⇤⇤    
( 2.26)
Q 0.00⇤⇤ 0.00⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.00⇤⇤⇤
(2.33) (2.43) (3.56) (3.29)
Size 0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤  0.02 0.06⇤⇤⇤
(3.34) (3.25) ( 0.25) (3.24)
Age  0.02  0.01 0.05  0.01
( 1.47) ( 0.80) (0.86) ( 1.10)
R2 0.08 0.09 0.24 0.07
N 582 582 91 491
Estimation is by IV-GMM robust standard errors. In-
dustry dummies are included. R&D stocks are con-
structed using a constant growth rate of eight percent.
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. (***,**,* repre-
sent significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.)
4.7 CONCLUSION
This paper examines whether the R&D investments of non-funded, high-tech manufactur-
ing firms in the U.S. were constrained during the Great Recession. Using data from the
Compustat database, I show that there were significant liquidity constraints on the R&D
investments of firms without access to bond markets. This result is also observed in young
firms, small firms and firms with no dividend payments, which are likely to face financial
constraints. Even though it is not possible to measure the economic importance of these
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Table 26: IV-GMM estimation: financial constraints in
R&D investment (di↵erent depreciation rates)
  = 0.10
Whole Sample All Firms B = 0 B = 1
LIQ 0.11⇤⇤⇤ 0.20⇤⇤⇤ 0.24⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤
(3.65) (4.90) (2.02) (2.04)
LIQ ⇤B    0.13⇤⇤    
( 3.82)
Q 0.00⇤⇤ 0.00⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.00⇤⇤⇤
(2.35) (2.51) (3.16) (3.38)
Size 0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤  0.02 0.06⇤⇤⇤
(3.22) (3.10) ( 0.27) (3.14)
Age  0.04⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤  0.02⇤
( 2.99) (1.97) ( 0.13) ( 1.94)
R2 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.06
N 577 577 88 489
  = 0.20
Whole Sample All Firms B = 0 B = 1
LIQ 0.13⇤⇤⇤ 0.20⇤⇤⇤ 0.27⇤⇤ 0.08⇤⇤
(3.58) (4.30) (2.02) (2.26)
LIQ ⇤B    0.11⇤⇤⇤    
( 2.74)
Q 0.00⇤⇤ 0.00⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤ 0.00⇤⇤⇤
(2.42) (2.53) (3.08) (3.08)
Size 0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.02 0.06⇤⇤⇤
(2.96) (2.88) (0.19) (2.84)
Age  0.02  0.01 0.03  0.02
( 1.63) ( 0.92) (0.54) ( 0.99)
R2 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.05
N 577 577 88 489
Estimation is by IV-GMM robust standard errors. Industry
dummies are included. R&D stocks are constructed assuming
di↵erent depreciation rates,   = 0.10 or   = 0.20. Z-statistics
are reported in parentheses. (***,**,* represent significance
level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.)
constraints, a simple calculation shows that if the constraints had been eliminated, the R&D
stocks of the median firm without access to bond markets could have increased by another
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Table 27: IV-GMM estimation: financial constraints
in capital investment - double-declining balance for
capital stocks
Whole Sample All Firms B = 0 B = 1
LIQ 0.08 0.16 0.37 0.03
(0.80) (1.01) (0.83) (0.46)
LIQ ⇤B    0.12    
( 0.89)
Q 0.01⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤
(2.09) (2.12) (3.43) (1.70)
Size 0.03 0.03    
(1.12) (1.13)
Age  0.02⇤⇤  0.04⇤    
( 2.09) ( 1.76)
R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.08
N 287 287 33 254
Estimation is by IV-GMM robust standard errors. Indus-
try dummies are included. Capital stocks are constructed
assuming double- declining balance. Z-statistics are re-
ported in parentheses. (***,**,* represent significance level
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.)
7.3 percentage points. This is a substantial change, since it is about one third of the actual
increase in R&D stocks. When capital and inventory investments are also considered, firms
without access to bond markets experience the tightest constraints on inventory investments
and the weakest constraints on R&D investments. The result also supports the time series
characteristics of these investments, inventories being the most and R&D being the least
volatile.
This paper contributes to the financial constraints literature by showing that financial
factors played an important role in firm investment during the Great Recession. It also
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provides insights into the fact that financial strength has a significant e↵ect on R&D, which
is a crucial factor for economic growth. The paper shows a direct link between liquidity
and R&D investments, liquidity being an important internal financial resource. The results
are less likely to be prone to endogeneity issues since the analysis focuses on the Great
Recession period as an exogenous case study. Furthermore, it shows that investment-liquidity
sensitivity can be a good measure of financial constraints for U.S. manufacturing firms.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 2
A.1 PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is similar to Arellano (2008).
First we show that value of repayment is increasing i asset holdings. For all {y,  } 2
D(B2),
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2
+
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u
✓
y(1   )
2
◆
+ u
✓
y(1 +  )
2
◆
+  E[✓vo(0, y0,  0) + (1  ✓)vd(y0,  0)] >
u
✓
y(1   )
2
+
B2   q(B0, y. )B0
2
◆
+ u
✓
y(1 +  )
2
+
B2   q(B0, y. )B0
2
◆
+  Evo(B0, y0,  0)  
u
✓
y(1   )
2
+
B1   q(B0, y. )B0
2
◆
+ u
✓
y(1 +  )
2
+
B1   q(B0, y. )B0
2
◆
+  Evo(B0, y0,  0).
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Hence, any pair of {y,  } that is in D(B2), we have {y,  } 2 D(B1).
Let d(B, y0,  0) denote the equilibrium default decision rule. Default probability satisfies
 (B, y0,  0) =
Z
d(B, y0,  0)f((y0,  0), y,  )d(y0,  0)
Since any {y,  } 2 D(B2), we have D(B2) ✓ D(B1), if d(B2, y0,  0) = 1, then d(B1, y0,  0) =
1. Hence,  (B1, y,  )    (B2, y,  ).
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The bond price is defined as q(B0, y,  ) = 1  (B
0,y, )
1+r . Using Proposition 1, we have B
1 <
B2  0 and  (B2, y,  ) <  (B1, y,  ). Hence, we get q(B2, y,  ) > q(B1, y,  ).
A.2 SOLUTION ALGORITHM
To solve the model numerically, we use the discrete state-space method. We discretize the
asset space using a finite set of grid points, making sure that the minimum and the maximum
points on the grid do not bind when we compute the optimal debt decision. Our solution
algorithm for the benchmark model is the following:1
1. Guess that the initial price is the reciprocal of the risk-free interest rate, and the initial
value function is equal to the autarky value.
2. Given a price q(B0, y,  ) and vo(B, y,  ), solve for the optimal policy functions and update
the value of option given as equation (2.10) by comparing vc(B, y,  ) and vd(y,  ).
3. Given the price function, compute the default probabilities.
4. Update the price function using equation (2.9).
5. We simultaneously check whether the initial guesses for price and the value of option
are close enough to their updated values. If not, we update the initial values and iterate
steps 2-4 until both bond price and the value of option functions converge.
1We use the same algorithm to solve the models with a single type of shock. For instance, for Model II,
the price function is denoted as q(B0, y), and value of option for default or repayment is denoted as vo(B, y).
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A.3 TABLES
Table 28: Rating conversion
Fitch Rating Score
AAA 23
AA+ 22
AA 21
AA- 20
A+ 19
A 18
A- 17
BBB+ 16
BBB 15
BBB- 14
BB+ 13
BB 12
BB- 11
B+ 10
B 9
B- 8
CCC+ 7
CCC 6
CCC- 5
CC 4
C 3
DDD 2
D 1
RD 1
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Table 29: VAR estimations for di↵erent countries
Country ⇢yy ⇢y  ⇢ y ⇢    2y  y    y  
2
 
Brazil 0.34 -0.25 0.09 0.64 5.6x10 4 5x10 5 5x10 5 8x10 5
Colombia 0.44 0.09 -0.15 0.33 1.4x10 4 2x10 5 2x10 5 8x10 5
Costa Rica 0.33 -0.07 0.05 0.74 4.5x10 5 -1x10 5 -1x10 5 9x10 5
Dominican Republic 0.26 -0.33 0.07 0.71 6x10 4 -1.3x10 5 -1.3x10 5 9x10 5
Ecuador 0.01 -0.33 0.20 0.82 1.3x10 3 -1.8x10 4 -1.8x10 4 2.3x10 4
Paraguay -0.74 0.24 -0.05 0.73 4x10 4 -4x10 5 -4x10 5 7x10 5
Uruguay 0.26 -0.33 0.07 0.71 6x10 4 -1.3x10 5 -1.3x10 5 9x10 5
Argentina 0.28 -0.56 0.05 0.79 1.2x10 3 -2x10 4 -2x10 4 1.3x10 4
In this VAR analysis, we assume that log output and the inequality follow a VAR(1) process such that
log(yt)
 t
 
=

cy
c 
 
+

⇢yy ⇢y 
⇢ y ⇢  
  
log(yt 1)
 t 1
 
+

"yt
" t
 
where
" =

"yt
" t
 
E ["] = 0 and V ar ["] =

 2y  y 
  y  2 
 
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 4
B.1 CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA FOR THE FIGURES 8 AND 10
• Use the annual frequency data from the Compustat database for the years 1990-2011
and keep firms that have their headquarters located in the U.S.
• Keep firms that have two-digit SIC numbers between 20-39. This eliminates all non-
manufacturing firms.
• Keep firms that report a stock price and firms that have employment data. These steps
improve consistency within the regression sample.
• Keep firms that report positive R&D expenditure (XRD, data item #46) data. Convert
the data into real values using the GDP deflator.1
• Classify firms with the following three-digit SIC codes as non-funded, high-tech firms:
283, 357, 366, 367, 382 and 384.
• Determine whether firms have access to bond markets using the existence of a bond
rating by Standard & Poor’s.
• Liquidity is defined as the ratio of cash and short-term investments as a fraction of total
assets.
• R&D-to asset ratio is defined as the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets.
• Winsorize variables at one percent from both tails.
1I used the FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) database from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
to assemble the data used herein.
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• Convert the data into quarterly units using linear interpolation.
B.2 CONSTRUCTION OF THE VARIABLES AND REGRESSION
SAMPLES
B.2.1 R&D Capital Stocks
The real R&D expenditures are calculated using the GDP deflator2 and R&D expenditure
data from the Compustat database (XRD, data item #46). Real R&D capital stock is
computed by a perpetual inventory method at the firm level by using the following equation:
RDi,t = (1   ) RDi,t 1 +XRDi,t. (B.1)
where RDi,t represents the R&D stock; XRDi,t represents the real R&D expenditures of
firm i at time t; and   is the depreciation rate. In order to obtain the initial R&D stock, the
first observation of the real R&D expenditure is divided by a constant rate of depreciation
( ) plus a growth rate (g).3 Following Hall et al. (2005), I use 15 percent as the constant
rate of depreciation.
The average growth rate of the R&D expenditure is calculated for each industry in the
sample. For a firm that has the first R&D expenditure data at year t, g is the average growth
rate of R&D expenditures in the industry that the firms belongs to in the period between
the first year the data are observed at the industry level and the year t. This procedure
generates di↵erent growth rates for firms that belong to di↵erent industries. Also, I remove
the firms that have their first observation of the R&D expenditures after 2006.
2I used the FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) database from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
to assemble the data used herein; see the references for information on the specific series.
3Some studies in the literature suggest taking a constant growth rate that applies to all firms, which is
around five or eight percent (Hall (1990), Hall (1993), Hall and Mairesse (1995)). Hall and Mairesse (1995)
point out that the choice of growth rate has an e↵ect on the initial stock, but it declines in importance as
time passes. More-recent studies choose growth rates that di↵er at the firm or industry level (Parisi et al.
(2006) and Lyandres and Palazzo (2012)). In this paper, the main results are obtained by using di↵erent
growth rates at the industry level. The results, obtained by using a fixed growth rate, are also reported as
a robustness check.
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B.2.2 Capital Stocks
Compustat reports the book value of capital (PPEGT, data item #7) and capital expendi-
tures (CAPX, data item #145); however, for this analysis, the replacement value of capital
stock is relevant. Following Salinger and Summers (1983), Fazzari et al. (1988) and Eberly
et al. (2008), the replacement value of capital stock is computed by using the following
recursion:
Ki,t =
✓
Ki,t 1
PK,t
PK,t 1
+ CAPXit
◆✓
1  1
Lj
◆
. (B.2)
The initial value for Ki is set to the first observation in the PPEGT series for firm, i. PK,t
refers to the price of capital and is the implicit price deflator for nonresidential investment
obtained from FRED.4 Lj refers to the useful life of capital goods in industry j. The useful
life of capital goods is calculated as
Lj =
1
Nj
X
i2j
PPEGTi,t 1 +DPi,t 1 + CAPXi,t
DPit
. (B.3)
DPit refers to the depreciation and amortization (Compustat Data Item #14) for firm i at
year t. Nj refers to the number of firms in industry j.
B.2.3 Other Variables
• Tobin’s Q (Market-to-book ratio of firm’s assets) is defined following Brown and Petersen
(2011):
Q =
(CSHO · PRCCF ) + AT   CEQ
AT 1
,
where the first variable in the numerator is the market value of equity, which is equal to
common shares outstanding (CSHO, data item # 25) times price close (PRCCF, data
item #199). Then, total assets (AT, data item #120) net of common equity (CEQ, data
item # 60) are added.
• SALES is defined as net sale (SALE, data item #117) divided by total assets (AT, data
item #120).
4I used the FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) database from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
to assemble the data used herein.
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• Liquidity is denoted by LIQ and defined as cash and short-term investments (CHE, data
item #1) divided by total assets (AT, data item #120).
Firm Age is computed based on the year in which price close data (PRCCF) are first
observed in the Compustat database. If the firm has data for less than 15 years after the
first observation of PRCCF, it is listed as young; otherwise, it is considered mature. Firm
Size is computed based on its number of employees (EMP, data item #29). If the firm’s
number of employees is below (above) the 75th percentile of the whole sample of firms, then
it is listed as small (large).
B.2.4 R&D Regression Sample
The dataset is between the years 2006 and 2008 and is in quarterly frequency. The dataset
is obtained from the Compustat database. I choose firms that are in the manufacturing
sector and have no missing data on 2006Q4, 2007Q4 and 2008Q4. I keep firms that have
their headquarters in the U.S. (based on Compustat variable, LOC). I remove firms that
have gone through mergers and acquisitions during this period (i.e., for these firms, DSLRN
is equal to one). Firms without any employment data, R&D stock data, or stock price data
are also removed.
B.2.5 R&D, Capital and Inventory Regression Sample
I applied steps similar to those of the construction of the R&D sample. Besides the R&D
stock, firms should also have capital stock, and real inventory data for 2006Q4, 2007Q4 and
2008Q4. The inventory data (INVT, data item # 3 ) are deflated using the CPI.5
5I used the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) database to assemble the
data used herein.
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B.3 TABLES
Table 30: Firm size, age and access to bond markets
B=1 Small Large Total
Young 80 3 83
Mature 5 0 5
Total 85 3 88
B=1 Small Large Total
Young 204 47 251
Mature 141 97 238
Total 345 134 489
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